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AGAINST ALL ODDS: HEDGE FUND 
ACTIVISM IN CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
Kobi Kastiel 
The importance of shareholder activism in widely held 
public companies is already broadly recognized. Less well 
understood, however, is the role that activist hedge funds play 
in public companies with a controlling shareholder, and the 
common view has been that dispersed stock ownership is 
typically a precondition for activist intervention. To fill this 
gap, this Article presents the first comprehensive account of 
hedge fund activism in controlled companies in the United 
States. Using empirical data and illustrative examples from 
recent years, the Article finds a surprising number of activist 
engagements with controlled companies, and unveils the 
variety of channels through which activism is deployed as 
well as the limitations of these channels. It concludes by 
offering regulators and institutional investors some 
suggestions for further empowering activists in controlled 
companies, such as granting investors unaffiliated with the 
controllers the right to elect minority directors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2008, the activist hedge funds Harbinger Capital 
Partners and Firebrand Partners sent a public letter to The 
New York Times Company. The activists, who together held 
4.9% of the company’s Class A shares, expressed the view 
that the company’s board had been ineffective in delivering 
value. They called for a renewed focus on the company’s core 
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assets and the redeployment of capital to expedite the 
company’s presence in digital media.1 The activists also 
criticized the Times Company’s empire building,2 and 
pressed the company to sell some of its non-core assets,3 such 
as its stakes in the Boston Red Sox,4 Roush Fenway Racing 
(a leading NASCAR race team),5 and The Boston Globe 
newspaper, which fared worse than many other metropolitan 
dailies in years that preceded the engagement.6 “There is 
nothing wrong with the New York Times Company that 
cannot be fixed with what is right with The New York 
Times,”7 the activists summarized. 
The timing of the activist engagement was not surprising. 
It started when the company’s share price had fallen to an 
eleven-year low,8 and after a long-term major shareholder, 
Morgan Stanley Investment Management, led a vocal two-
year campaign criticizing the Times Company’s business 
performance and corporate governance practices.9 During the 
 
1 Exhibit to The New York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 7 
(Jan. 1, 2008). 
2 In addition to its flagship newspaper, the Times Company owned 
thirty-one regional newspapers, twenty magazines, five television stations, 
two radio stations, and other businesses. It also had a half-interest, with 
the Washington Post Company, in The International Herald Tribune, the 
Boston Red Sox, and a NASCAR race team. See infra note 14. 
3 See supra note 1. 
4 The New York Times Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Feb. 22, 
2011). 
5 Id. 
6 See Russell Adams, New York Times May Cut Payout, WALL. ST. J. 
(Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122478493122263159?cb=lo 
gged0.7962122080435743 [https://perma.cc/MTR7-97VR] (noting that in 
2006, the Times, which paid $1.1 billion for the Globe in 1993 (among the 
highest prices paid for an American newspaper), took an $814 million 
write-down on its New England assets). 
7 See supra note 1. 
8 Joshua Chaffin, Hedge Fund Lashes Out at NYT Board, FIN. TIMES, 
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5eae7fba-cd3a-11dc-9b2b-
000077b07658.html#axzz42LvTOajM [https://perma.cc/TB9C-F3CJ]. 
9 See, e.g., Merissa Marr, New York Times Co. Relents on Board Seats, 
WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12057729196 
9142019 [https://perma.cc/7ZQR-QU6J] (reporting this campaign). 
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course of its campaign, Morgan Stanley argued that 
according to independent analysts the Times Company’s 
shares were worth 50% more than its stock price at the time, 
that they were deeply underpriced because of improper 
management, and that despite such significant 
underperformance, management’s total compensation had 
increased considerably over this period.10 Indeed, at the 
company’s 2007 annual meeting, public investors holding 
42% of the Times Company’s Class A shares withheld their 
votes for directors in protest.11 
The activists’ pressures were not fruitless. In March 2008, 
Harbinger and Firebrand reached a settlement agreement 
with the Times Company pursuant to which the company 
agreed to increase the size of the board from thirteen to 
fifteen members and to appoint the activists’ nominees to the 
board.12 Additionally, in the years following the engagement, 
the company started to implement investors’ demands for 
changes to the business. It reduced capital spending, lowered 
its operating costs,13 and divested itself of underperforming 
assets such as The Boston Globe.14 
 
10 Morgan Stanley Investment Management (Schedule 13D) 5 (Apr. 
18, 2006). 
11 Supra note 9. Excluding stock held by the controlling family, this 
figure represented a majority of shareholders unaffiliated with the 
controller. 
12 See The New York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Mar. 
17, 2008). 
13 See supra note 6 (noting that Times Company executives said the 
company would exceed its cost-cutting target of $230 million by 2009 and 
that it would look for more opportunities to reduce debt). See also Joshua 
Chaffin, New Voices to Join Call for Change at NY Times, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
22, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ff731a6e-0fc5-11dd-8871-0000779 
fd2ac.html#axzz42LvTOajM [https://perma.cc/4GEM-LF88] (describing the 
company’s cut in the newsroom staff). 
14 Christine Haughney, New York Times Company Sells Boston Globe, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/business/ 
media/new-york-times-company-sells-boston-globe.html?_r=0 [https://per 
ma.cc/2YDG-K8SR]. Additionally, starting in 2009 the Times Company 
pursued a sale of its stakes in radio stations and regional news groups. By 
2012, the company sold its sixteen regional newspapers, as well as the 
“About” Group and its stake in the Red Sox. See Greg Bensinger, New 
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At first glance, this intervention looks no different than 
many other engagements with large U.S. companies 
conducted by activist hedge funds, which accumulate large 
but non-controlling stakes in target companies to bring about 
change in the companies’ strategic, operational, or financial 
activity, often while threatening to nominate their 
representatives to the board.15 In the last decade, hedge 
funds have become critical players in the corporate 
governance arena,16 and hundreds of activist campaigns have 
resulted in board seats.17 But the engagement with The New 
York Times Company is far from typical. The New York 
Times Company is a company with concentrated ownership; 
since the purchase of the newspaper by Adolph S. Ochs in 
1896, control of the company has rested with his family.18 
 
York Times to Get $45 Million for Radio Station, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 
14, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-07-14/new-york-
times-to-get-45-million-for-radio-station [https://perma.cc/TUT9-P8B7]. 
See also Beth Healy, New York Times Co. Sells Last of its Stake in Red 
Sox, BOS. GLOBE (May 11, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/ 
2012/05/11/new-york-times-sells-its-remaining-stake-boston-red-sox/ey4kw 
U4m6Xn2PYfcblrMcL/story.html [https://perma.cc/BK3X-FVJX]. 
15 For a detailed definition of the main characters of hedge funds, see 
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 
1734–36 (2008). 
16 Up until a decade ago, the general view among corporate law 
scholars has been that public shareholders are generally passive and 
suffer from a collective action problem, and are therefore unable to 
effectively monitor management or controlling shareholders. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 204–
08 (3d ed. 2009). Institutional investors, who for a short period emerged as 
the new hope, also failed to deliver on their promise to provide more 
disciplined monitoring of management, as they suffer from inadequate 
incentives, conflicts of interest, and regulatory constraints. See, e.g., 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048–57 (2007). 
17 Activists Increasing Success Gaining Board Seats at U.S. 
Companies, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.shark 
repellent.net/pub/rs_20140310.html [https://perma.cc/XLL3-9TRD]. 
18 See The New York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 4–
10 (Mar. 25, 2008). 
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Engagements with controlled companies should be rare, at 
least according to the conventional theory, since the presence 
of a controlling shareholder dramatically reduces the 
chances of a successful activist campaign.19 So what forces 
motivate activist hedge funds to engage with controlled 
companies? Could extra-legal forces—particularly the 
reputational concerns of controlling shareholders—serve as a 
substitute for activists’ ability to influence the voting rights 
of a controlled firm? 
While an emerging body of legal and financial literature 
has examined the impact of activist hedge funds on the 
governance and value of the public firm,20 little attention has 
been devoted to the role they play in controlled companies.21 
Instead, the common view has simply held that hedge fund 
activism “is unlikely to be deployed where dispersed 
ownership is lacking.”22 To fill this gap, the Article presents 
 
19 As discussed in Part II.B, the low chances of an activist campaign’s 
succeeding are due to lack of a proxy fight threat and activists’ limited 
ability to influence the voting results. 
20 See, e.g., infra notes 22, 36–40 (listing academic research on hedge 
fund activism). 
21 The academic literature and Delaware case law use a broad 
definition of a controlled company to include a company with a dominant 
shareholder who exercises effective control over the corporate affairs by 
owning a significant fraction, but not necessarily the majority, of the 
company voting power. For a discussion, see infra note 84. In this Article, I 
define a controlled company as one where at least 30% of the voting rights 
are held by one dominant shareholder or a group of affiliated holders. It is 
a relatively high cutoff of insider ownership, aimed at confirming that an 
outside shareholder cannot easily contest such effective control. 
22 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 68–69 
(2011) (noting that “influence-driven activism is unlikely to be deployed 
where dispersed ownership is lacking”); Dionysia Katelouzou, Worldwide 
Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions and Legal Determinants, 17 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 789, 800 (2015) (noting that “the existence of controlling blocks in 
the candidate target company constitutes a ‘structural’ barrier to 
shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds”) [hereinafter 
Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism]; Tilman H. Drerup, Long-
Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism in Germany (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with The Columbia Business Law Review) (noting that 
hedge funds avoid targets with strong incumbent shareholders). 
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the first comprehensive account of hedge fund activism in 
controlled U.S. companies. Based on a review of over 200 
activist engagements targeting public companies with 
concentrated ownership from 2005 to 2014, it unveils the 
variety of channels through which activism is deployed 
against controlled companies, as well as their limitations. 
A detailed analysis of the intensity of activism in 
controlled companies and of the channels that facilitate 
activist campaigns against those companies may have 
important implications beyond the descriptive and 
theoretical levels. First, such analysis is a crucial step before 
regulators decide whether to intervene in the marketplace, 
and what measures, if any, should be taken to increase 
activism in controlled companies. Second, this setting of 
activism against controlling shareholders also explores a new 
perspective on an interesting, long-standing issue in 
corporate governance—the potential role of reputation and 
extra-legal forces as alternative disciplinary mechanisms. A 
number of scholars have expressed the view that controlling 
shareholders might limit their efforts to divert firm 
resources to their pockets out of concern for their 
reputation,23 but there is little empirical evidence examining 
the extent to which reputation markets replace, or at least 
supplement, legal mechanisms.24 Since activists have a 
limited ability to influence firm decision-making when a 
target has a controlling shareholder, studying activist 
engagements with controlled companies is useful to examine 
whether reputation markets are effective enough in 
 
23 See infra note 149. 
24 Dyck and Zingales provide in their paper anecdotal examples of the 
potential disciplinary power of reputation. One of them was the successful 
activist engagement of Roberts Monks with Sears. Monks succeeded in 
initiating some major changes at the company after exposing to The Wall 
Street Journal the identity of Sears’ directors and labeling them the “non-
performing assets of the company." According to Dyck and Zingales, “[t]he 
embarrassment for the directors was so great that they implemented all 
the changes proposed by Monks.” See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 
577 (2004). 
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compelling controllers to be more attentive to activists’ 
demands. 
A review of activists’ engagements with controlled 
companies reveals a few important findings. First, it shows 
that although controlled companies are more insulated from 
activism than widely held companies, they are not fully 
immune to it. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this Article 
documents a non-negligible number of shareholder 
engagements with controlled firms,25 and it shows that 
activists’ bargaining power vis-à-vis controllers is not always 
as limited as initially predicted. It also shows that activism 
in controlled companies is not substantially different in 
nature from activism conducted in widely held companies. 
These engagements are often conferential, and in a large 
number of them activists also try to initiate strategic 
changes aimed to improve the way controllers manage their 
companies.26 These unexpected findings trigger a question 
that stands at the heart of this Article: What mechanisms do 
activist hedge funds use when engaging with controlled 
companies? 
This Article highlights a few motivating forces that 
increase activists’ bargaining power vis-à-vis controllers and 
encourage activism, including the ability to nominate and 
elect minority directors in certain dual-class firms27 or 
effectively-controlled firms,28 to veto certain conflicted 
transactions (such as going-private transactions), and to 
conduct activism in the shadow of litigation.29 
 
25 See infra Part III.A. 
26 See infra Part III.B. 
27 In a typical dual-class company, there is a publicly traded class of 
stock with inferior voting rights and an additional class of stock with 
superior voting rights, often not publicly traded. This latter class of stock 
is usually owned by the insiders of the firm and causes a significant wedge 
between the insiders’ voting and cash-flow rights. See Paul A. Gompers, 
Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-
Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010). 
28 Delaware law and corporate scholars recognize that a stockholder 
can achieve a controlling status with less than 50% of the voting power. 
For a discussion, see infra note 84 and Subpart IV.A.2. 
29 See infra Part IV. 
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Activists’ ability to elect minority directors in certain 
dual-class firms (a mechanism that has received little 
attention from legal scholars) is of particular interest, as 
such a mechanism, which does not depend upon the 
existence of a conflicted transaction or a breach of fiduciary 
duty, generates a relatively high percentage of successful 
engagements with controlled companies. An examination of 
the origin of this mechanism shows that it was a product of 
an historical compromise between the American Stock 
Exchange (“AMEX”) and issuers who wanted to take their 
companies public with a dual-class structure during a period 
when the use of dual-class stock was prohibited by the most 
important stock exchange at the time, the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”). However, current listing requirements 
of the major U.S. stock exchanges no longer impose any 
restrictions on new issuances of unequal voting stock, and 
controlled companies that went public in the past decade, 
when hedge fund activism gained steam, were less likely to 
voluntarily adopt such an arrangement and subject 
themselves to the disciplinary power of activist holders.30 
This raises another important question as to whether 
activist shareholders are willing to engage with controlled 
companies even when they lack any formal, legal rights that 
could facilitate those interactions. This Article uses the 
setting of “against all odds” engagements—engagements 
when the control is fully uncontested and the activists have 
no legal rights to challenge a controller—to explore whether 
the reputational concerns of controlling shareholders could 
serve as a substitute for the formal channels of activism, and 
make controllers attentive to activists’ demands. Such 
examination shows that reputational concerns could play a 
role in disciplining controllers, but mostly when these forces 
serve as a complementary mechanism, operating in 
conjunction with other formal bargaining mechanisms that 
increase the public profile of an engagement, such as 
activists’ ability to nominate a minority director and declare 
a proxy contest against the controller. When activists have 
 
30 See infra Part IV.A. 
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no apparent formal bargaining mechanisms, reputational 
markets alone have a mild disciplinary effect, at best, on 
controlling shareholders.31 
Finally, despite the evidence showing that controlled 
companies are not fully insulated from activist interventions, 
this Article predicts that activists’ ability to continue 
engaging with such companies could be severely limited in 
the future. A recent upward trend in the adoption of dual-
class stock without any minority protections, such as board 
representation,32 is likely to better shield controllers from 
the disciplinary power of activists. The Article, therefore, 
calls upon regulators and institutional investors who view 
activism as an important disciplinary mechanism to not rely 
solely on the existing legal framework or on reputation 
markets to facilitate this activity. Instead, they are urged to 
adopt arrangements that will further encourage activism in 
controlled companies, and the most efficient way to 
accomplish this goal would be to grant shareholders 
unaffiliated with the controllers the right to elect minority 
directors. 
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays 
out the stakes and then proceeds to introduce the initial 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between ownership 
structure and shareholder activism. As noted, this initial 
hypothesis suggests that hedge fund activism “is unlikely to 
be deployed where dispersed ownership is lacking.”33 Part III 
tests the validity of the initial hypothesis and presents data 
that is somewhat counter to it. Part IV presents the formal 
mechanisms that activist hedge funds use when engaging 
with controlled companies, and Part V supplements it by 
exploring the extent to which reputation markets discipline 
controllers. Part VI addresses concerns that activists’ 
engagements with controlled companies could be harmful to 
other minority shareholders. It also shows that those 
 
31 See infra Part V. 
32 See supra notes 206, 212, and 224. 
33 See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 22. See also Katelouzou, 
Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 22; Drerup, supra note 22. 
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concerns are not supported by general evidence or by the 
data presented in this Article. Finally, Part VII analyzes the 
various policy implications of the Article’s findings. 
II. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN CONTROLLED 
COMPANIES: BACKGROUND 
A. The Stakes 
Many scholars consider the emergence of activist hedge 
funds as a major, ground-breaking shift in the corporate 
governance of public firms. Jonathan Macey, for instance, 
claimed that hedge funds “are the newest big thing in 
corporate governance”34 and that they “actually deliver on 
their promise to provide more disciplined monitoring of 
management . . . .”35 Frank Partnoy and Randall Thomas 
argued that “hedge funds recently have shaken up 
boardrooms and forced radical changes at many publicly-
traded firms.”36 And Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon see 
these activists as “governance entrepreneurs” who “arbitrage 
governance rights that become more valuable through their 
activity monitoring companies to identify strategic 
opportunities.”37 
Consistent with these claims, compelling empirical 
evidence supports the view that activist hedge funds can fill 
the monitoring gap created by “rationally apathetic” 
institutional shareholders by providing a closer check on 
management action. For instance, numerous studies on 
 
34 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 241 (2008). 
35 Id., at 272. See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 1047 (hoping 
that activist hedge funds “may act ‘like real owners’ and provide a check 
on management discretion”). 
36 Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and 
Financial Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert 
E. Litan eds., 2007). 
37 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897 (2013). 
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hedge fund activism find a correlation between interventions 
by activist hedge funds and positive stock market reactions 
following the engagement announcements.38 Moreover, a 
recent study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang 
shows that improved operating performance follows activist 
interventions not only in the short term, but also in the long 
term, during the five-year period following these 
interventions.39 Finally, a recent survey of sixty-seven 
studies on shareholder activism concludes that hedge fund 
activism, which often involves the formation of ownership 
blocks, is associated with improvements in share values and 
firm operations, and has become more value increasing over 
time.40 
However, not everyone sees hedge fund activism as a 
positive development. Critics of hedge fund activism claim 
that hedge fund interventions are value-decreasing in the 
long term, and that activists tend to use their power to force 
management to disgorge cash in lieu of investing in long-
term growth,41 though these criticisms are generally made 
with limited empirical evidence.42 
 
38 See, e.g., April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder 
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN., 187, 207–
11, 225–26 (2009); Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 15, at 
1755–57; Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge 
Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 328–33 (2008). See 
also Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 
92 J. FIN. ECON., 362–75 (2009) (finding that hedge funds specializing in 
forcing mismanaged target firms into mergers generate significantly 
positive returns). 
39 Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
40 Matthew Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria McWilliams, 
Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research 
(May 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=26 
08085 [http://perma.cc/78WJ-YXL3]. 
41 See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era 
of Activism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013), http://dealbook.ny 
times.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7GJ-XSAT]; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Bite the 
Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 23, 2013), 
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Regardless of which side of the debate one supports, one 
thing is clear: activist hedge funds are important players in 
the corporate governance arena and are here to stay. The 
importance of activist funds is also reflected by the dramatic 
increase in their activity over the past fifteen years. Assets 
managed by activist hedge funds were worth $23 billion in 
2002,43 grew to $100 billion in 2006,44 and to approximately 
$200 billion by the beginning of 2015.45 According to a recent 
report, the number of activist campaigns in 2014 reached 




42 For studies invoked by critics of hedge fund activism, see Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Is 2015, Like 1985, an Inflection Year?, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://corpgov. 
law.harvard.edu/2015/12/08/is-2015-like-1985-an-inflection-year/ [https:// 
perma.cc/32L9-YB69]. For a critical analysis of the evidence raised by 
hedge fund opponents, see Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & 
Thomas Keusch, The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: A Reply to 
Cremers, Giambona, Sepe, and Wang, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2015/12/10/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism-a-reply-to-crem 
ers-giambona-sepe-and-wang/ [https://perma.cc/WM2T-QGCV]; Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1642–44 (2013). 
43 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 22, at 56–58 (discussing the move of 
hedge funds to the center stage). 
44 Id. 
45 See Top Activist Hedge Funds Close in on $200 Billion Mark; 
ValueAct Capital, Elliott Management & JANA Partners Lead the Way, 
HEDGETRACKER.COM (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.hedgetracker.com/article/ 
Top-Activist-Hedge-Funds-close-in-on-200-billion-mark-ValueAct-Capital-
Elliott-Management-JANA-Partners-lead-the-way [http://perma.cc/6RFN-
Y7JG]. Even according to a more conservative estimation, the total assets 
under the management of activists funds, which was approximately $50 
billion in 2012, is still significant. See THECITYUK, FIN. MARKETS SERIES: 
HEDGE FUNDS 4 (May 2013). 
46 David A. Katz, Engagement and Activism in the 2015 Proxy Season, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 6, 2015), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/02/06/engagement-and-activism-in-the-
2015-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/DZ94-GYN3].  
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Surprisingly, although hedge fund activism has become 
such a significant phenomenon, scholars give little attention 
to the role, if any, that activists play in controlled companies. 
This topic warrants examination as a significant number of 
controlled companies exist even in the United States, where 
the model of widely held firms has long been dominant,47 and 
the number of controlled companies keeps increasing due to 
a general upward trend in the adoption of dual-class stock 
structures.48 Furthermore, activist hedge funds have recently 
entered the corporate governance arena of many European 
countries,49 where concentrated ownership is the most 
prevalent type of ownership structure.50 The international 
expansion of hedge fund activism makes the topic and 
 
47 See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the 
United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1382 (2009) (using a sample of 375 
U.S. public corporations and finding that the average size of the largest 
block is 26%); Ronald Anderson, Augustine Duru & David M. Reeb, 
Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the U.S., 92 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 
207 (2008) (showing that in the 2000 largest industrial U.S. firms, 
founder-controlled firms constitute 22.3% and heir-controlled firms 
comprise 25.3%, with average equity stakes of approximately 18% and 
22%, respectively). 
48 This trend gained steam in 2004, when Google decided to go public 
with a dual-class structure, granting its co-founders almost two-thirds of 
company voting power. See, e.g., Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Grip 
Becomes New Normal in Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-beco 
mes-new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech [https://perma.cc/9MPQ-KN5R] 
(quoting Lise Buyer, principal at Class V Group in California: “When 
Google did it, there was tremendous pushback from the banks . . . . Today 
the bankers are often the ones suggesting it. It may be everybody tries it, 
because the market seems to be giving everyone a pass.”). 
49 See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund 
Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 460, 463–64 
(2013) (showing that hedge funds in Europe and Asia have become more 
active in corporate governance decisions, and providing prominent 
examples) [hereinafter Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund 
Activism]; see also sources in infra notes 60, 65–68. 
50 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491–97 
(1999); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of 
Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 365 (2002). 
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findings of this Article important to policy makers both in 
the United States and in other countries. 
B. The Initial Hypothesis 
On its own, the presence of a controlling shareholder does 
not preclude other shareholders from acquiring a minority 
stake in a company. In theory, however, the existence of a 
controller should have a chilling effect on shareholder 
activism as a disciplinary mechanism, and should reduce 
activists’ ex ante incentives to launch a campaign against a 
company. An activist player will choose to engage with a 
target if its expected benefits from an engagement outweigh 
its costs,51 which are related to identifying potential targets, 
financing an equity position, and communicating with the 
target.52 While the ownership structure of a target does not 
directly affect the costs of an activist campaign, the activist’s 
expected return, which is a function of the size of its block 
and the expected increase in the target’s stock price as a 
result of a successful intervention, likely decreases when the 
ownership percentage of the controller increases. This 
happens for two main reasons. 
First, even if an activist shareholder attracts broad 
support from other passive investors,53 the activist likely 
cannot bring credible proposals for change when a 
controlling shareholder, who often captures significant 
 
51 For a comprehensive analysis as to when shareholder activism is a 
rational strategy, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 22, at 61–68. 
52 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 37, at 898 (discussing such costs). 
Nickolay Gantchev estimates that a public activist campaign that reaches 
the confrontational level of a proxy fight costs $10.5 million, on average. 
Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 623 (2013). Engagement 
costs should be lower if an activist can prompt management to make 
changes with an initial letter, telephone call, or e-mail, and without 
initiating a fully-fledged proxy contest. 
53 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 37, at 897–98 (noting in the context of 
widely held firms that hedge fund intervention could succeed if the hedge 
fund manages to “attract broad support from institutional investors 
capable of assessing alternative strategies presented to them”). 
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private benefits from the status quo, controls a sufficiently 
large block of votes to deter or veto unwelcome shareholder 
initiatives.54 Since activists’ opportunity to generate profits 
from an undervalued company depends on the feasibility of 
bringing about change, the existence of a controller, who can 
block any proposal for change, should discourage activism.55 
Second, most activist campaigns operate in the shadow of 
a proxy fight for board representation. Although only a 
relatively small number of campaigns result in an actual 
proxy fight and activist hedge funds rarely seek to obtain 
full-scale voting control in their targets,56 the mere threat of 
activists to nominate their representatives to the board 
encourages management of target companies to settle with 
the activists.57 This threat of a proxy fight, however, lacks 
bite when a controlling shareholder exercises control over 
the firm’s voting rights. 
Since activist shareholders have limited resources for 
engagements, they prioritize targets. All else being equal, 
 
54 Initiating governance changes is a complicated task even in widely 
held firms (see, e.g., Sharon Hannes, The Determinants and Consequences 
of Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J. CORP. L. 
51, 63–64 (2004)), and it becomes almost impossible when firms have a 
controlling shareholder. 
55 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 22, at 68–69. See also Katelouzou, 
Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 22; Drerup, supra note 22. 
56 Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 15, at 1743 (reporting 
that in only 4% of their sampled activist interventions, the activist funds 
intended to take the target over, and in only 13% of the interventions, the 
activists launched a proxy contest); Gantchev, supra note 52, at 618–19 
(showing that only 6.4% of the activist campaigns actually end up in a 
proxy contest); Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism, 
supra note 49, at 493 (showing that only 3.9% of the campaigns seek to 
launch a takeover bid). 
57 See, e.g., Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 36, at 136 (noting that 
“just the potential threat of hedge fund activism may stimulate corporate 
managers to engage in value maximizing change of control transactions 
before they become targets”); Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge 
Fund Activism, supra note 49, at 497 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most 
drastic strategy an activist hedge fund can employ in the course of an 
activist campaign is to threaten to launch—or actually launch—a takeover 
bid”). 
KASTIEL – FINAL 
76 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
the general hypothesis suggests that the presence of a 
controlling shareholder should make controlled companies 
less attractive targets for activists than widely held 
companies.58 Or, as some scholars predict, “[d]ispersed stock 
ownership therefore is typically a necessary precondition for 
an influence-based intervention.”59  
C. Prior Empirical Research 
Although there is a large body of literature on hedge fund 
activism, none of the research focuses specifically on 
activism in controlled U.S. companies or on the channels 
through which activists operate in these companies. 
A couple of comparative studies investigating hedge fund 
activism mostly in Europe, where companies with 
concentrated ownership are more prevalent, found some 
evidence of activism. The most notable study by Marco Becht 
et al. covers nearly 1800 activist interventions in twenty-
three countries,60 and it documents activist interventions in 
countries with concentrated ownership, such as Belgium, 
 
58 As noted, the expected benefit from an activist intervention is a 
function of both the probability of success and the increase in the target 
share price as a result of the intervention. In theory, one could argue that 
since certain controlled companies enjoy strong insulation from market 
mechanisms, they are, on average, more likely to underperform, and 
therefore the higher expected returns from an activist engagement with 
these companies may compensate, at least partially, for the lower success 
rate. However, an activist will prefer to engage with a widely held firm if 
(i) target past performance is held equal or (ii) if the activist estimates the 
success probability of a campaign against a controlled company to be close 
to zero. 
59 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 22, at 68–69. The authors also note, 
however, that there can be exceptions, such as when minority 
shareholders have the right to select a director in a company that provides 
for “cumulative” voting for directors, or when the activist lobbies for the 
company to dismantle its dual-class share structure by buying out the 
special class of shares. See also Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund 
Activism, supra note 22. 
60 See Marco Becht, Julian R. Franks, Jeremy Grant & Hannes F. 
Wagner, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study, 1 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper, 2014) (researching 
interventions between 2000–2010). 
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Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South 
Korea, and Sweden, although the number of activist 
incidents in those countries is still substantially lower than 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.61 Another 
recent study also shows that while activist interventions 
exist even in countries with concentrated ownership,62 the 
incidence of activism in those countries is significantly lower 
than in countries with dispersed ownership, such as the 
United Kingdom and Japan.63 
Other studies focus on hedge fund activism in specific 
European countries. For instance, Massimo Belcredi and 
Luca Enriques find that corporate governance reforms 
implemented in Italy over the last twenty years have 
increased the scope of hedge-fund activism with Italian 
public firms.64 Similarly, Matteo Erede shows that activist 
funds made substantial investments, reaching a total value 
of more than $3.5 billion in forty Italian-listed companies in 
early 2008,65 the vast majority of which (thirty-three) are 
controlled.66 
 
61 Id. at 50 (see table noting the number of engagement in those 
countries). 
62 See Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism, supra 
note 49, at 473–74; Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism, supra 
note 22, at 43 (detailing the number of activist events in different 
European countries, including the following: Germany (thirty), France 
(twenty-five), the Netherlands (twenty), Italy (eleven), and Switzerland 
(ten). Activist events were also reported in Brazil, Spain and Sweden). 
63 Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 22, at 42 
(presenting a sample of 432 activist campaigns, and finding that the 
United Kingdom and Japan dominate the sample, making up 53.47% of 
the total targets). 
64 Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism 
in a Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of 
Control: The Case of Italy 14–15 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law 
Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421 
[http://perma.cc/L5BL-PT5M] (observing 369 hedge fund transactions with 
Italian public companies between 2001 to 2013). 
65 Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated 
Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in 
Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 
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Another study exploring hedge fund engagements in 
Germany67 used a sample of blockholders who possessed, on 
average, 36% of all outstanding shares.68 The authors 
anticipated that the ability of hedge funds to restructure 
target firms might be weakened when other dominant 
shareholders invested in the target firm, since those 
shareholders are able to capture significant private benefits 
from the status quo, and thus have strong incentives to 
oppose hedge funds’ demands.69 Indeed, the authors found 
that engagements with firms with dominant shareholders 
had significantly lower short-term announcement returns.70 
Although the comparative studies mentioned in this Part 
clearly show that hedge fund activism is more prevalent in 
the United States than in countries with more concentrated 
ownership,71 it is unclear whether the variation in the level 
of activism across countries can be attributed to the 
differences in ownership structure or to other variables, such 
as financial, legal, and historical differences between those 
regimes and the United States.72 For instance, differences 
among countries regarding legal rules and in the intensity of 
law enforcement could have a major impact on the ease with 
 
328, 356–59 (2013) (also noting that most of these funds are event-driven 
ones). 
66 Id. at 358.  
67 Wolfgang Bessler, Wolfgang Drobetz & Julian Holler, The Returns 
to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany, 1 EUR. FIN. MGMT 1, 116 (2013) 
(using a sample from 2000 to 2006). For an additional study on hedge 
funds activism in Germany, see Drerup, supra note 22 (finding that funds’ 
investments are more probable if larger percentages of shares are 
considered as free float). 
68 Wolfgang Bessler, Wolfgang Drobetz & Julian Holler, The Returns 
to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany, 1 EUR. FIN. MGMT 1, 124 (2013) 
(providing data on ownership structure of hedge funds’ target firms). 
69 Id. at 109. 
70 Id. at 136. The authors also show that total return is significantly 
higher if the dominant shareholder is a corporation. According to them, 
such blockholders (corporations) are less likely to oppose hedge funds’ 
demands. 
71 See Becht et al., supra note 60, at 50; Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge 
Fund Activism, supra note 22. 
72 See infra notes 73–76. 
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which shareholders can intervene in a target company. Some 
jurisdictions are friendlier to activists than others, and those 
differences may affect the number of activist events, as well 
as their probability of success.73 
Indeed, Dionysia Katelouzou examines the impact of legal 
rules on activism, and finds that the number of activist 
campaigns is larger in countries with stronger mandatory 
disclosure and shareholder protection regimes.74 Similarly, 
Marco Becht el al. show that jurisdiction affects the level of 
activist engagements and their overall profitability,75 
although they acknowledge that such variation in activists’ 
success rate to some degree is conditional on institutional 
characteristics of countries.76 
This Article takes a different approach from the above-
mentioned comparative studies. First, it studies 
interventions in U.S. companies only, and compares the level 
of activism in controlled companies to that in widely held 
companies while creating a setting where most economic, 
legal, and cultural variables are the same. Second, and more 
importantly, this Article focuses not only on the potential 
effect of ownership structure on the level of activism, but 
also on the actual channels through which activism is 
deployed. Such examination is useful for understanding the 
dynamic between activist players and controlling 
shareholders, and may be important for policy makers 
 
73 See, Becht et al., supra note 60, at 11–17, 37–38. See also Belcredi 
& Enriques, supra note 64, at 5–6. 
74 Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 22, at 48–
51, 61 (reporting that this difference is statistically significant at less than 
the 5% level. However, her results with respect to the advanced stages of 
activism provide little support to this view). 
75 Becht et al., supra note 60, at 11–17, 37–38. 
76 Id. at 37. These “institutional characteristics” include variation in 
the composition of the target’s ownership across countries, but also other 
historical, fiscal, jurisdictional or cultural differences. See also Amir N. 
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural 
Theory of Corporate Governance System, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 152–57 
(2001) (emphasizing the importance of national culture as an explanatory 
variable for differences in corporate governance systems). 
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interested in designing a regulatory solution to encourage 
activism in controlled companies. 
III. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
This Part tests the validity of the initial hypothesis 
presented in Part II by conducting a review of hedge fund 
engagements with controlled U.S. companies. 
A. Data Collection 
The data was collected in three stages. First, I collected 
data from SharkRepellent’s database on activist 
engagements, mostly for the period from January 2005 
through May 2014,77 with public companies that were on the 
Russell 3000 index as of 2014. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) requires an investor to file a disclosure 
statement on Schedule 13D within ten days after acquiring 
5% of a target’s outstanding shares,78 and those are 
monitored by SharkWatch, the corporate activism database 
of SharkRepellent.79 
 
77 SharkWatch provides systemic data on corporate activism as of 
January 2005, though some data on proxy fights or engagements by 
certain prominent funds is available as of 2000, and was included in the 
sample. 
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2011) 
(requiring beneficial owners of more than five percent of voting class of 
registered company’s equity to file within ten days Schedule 13D, 
reporting acquisition and other information such as identity and 
background of acquirer and purpose of purchase). 
79 The data on activism from SharkWatch also contains information 
on events conducted by fifty significant activist investors even if these 
activists do not cross the 5% threshold, and thus are not subject to 
reporting requirements. Also, I excluded from the data “exempt 
solicitations,” which are mostly employed by institutional investors and 
not hedge funds. Those solicitations, which are exempt from disclosure 
rules pursuant to Rule 14a-2(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2015), usually involve dissident 
communications to stockholders to persuade them to vote for or against a 
resolution. 
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In the second stage, I cross-referenced the activism data 
provided by SharkWatch with information obtained from 
SharkRepellent and FactSet on the “insider ownership”80 of 
these companies, and their use of dual-class stock. 
In the third and final stage, I expanded the pool of targets 
described in the preceding paragraphs by collecting and 
analyzing additional data from SharkWatch on historic 
activist engagements with controlled companies that are no 
longer in the Index and for which FactSet has available 
information on their historic insider ownership percentage, 
to create a sample of 209 activist events81 with 110 targets 
(the “Full Sample”).82 For each company on this Full Sample, 
I manually checked the data on insider ownership to correct 
discrepancies and confirm that a target has a controlling 
shareholder.83 A company with a controlling shareholder is a 
company where at least 30% of the voting rights are held by 
one dominant shareholder or a group of affiliated holders 
(such as family members, co-founders, or shareholders with 
voting agreements).84 I used this Full Sample to examine 
 
80 “Insider Ownership” measures the total percentage of common 
shares owned by the company’s executives, directors, or owners of 5% or 
more of the company’s common shares who are not institutional investors. 
81 In most cases, an event is counted as a filing of a Schedule 13D and 
subsequent amendments. Occasionally, when the same activist conducts 
multiple campaigns in different years and files a new Schedule 13D, 
SharkWatch counts those multiple campaigns as separate events. 
82 Although this sample does not constitute an exhaustive list of all 
activist engagements with Russell 3000 controlled firms, it covers a large 
number of these engagements. 
83 SharkRepellent’s data on “Insider Ownership” only measures the 
level of ownership concentration at a given company, but not necessarily 
the existence of a controlling shareholder. When a company has a number 
of unaffiliated shareholders, with each holding 5% to 10% of the company’s 
outstanding shares, the total percentage of insider ownership could be 
very high, despite the fact that the company does not have a dominant 
shareholder. For this reason, the data on the existence of a controlling 
shareholder had to be collected separately. 
84 I used a relatively high cutoff of insider ownership to confirm that 
the controllers of the sampled companies exercise an effective control over 
the companies’ voting rights, and that an outside shareholder cannot 
easily contest such effective control. Obviously, a dominant shareholder 
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certain alternative hypotheses related to activism in 
controlled companies, and to explore in greater detail the 
different channels through which activism is employed in 
controlled companies. 
B. Results and Analysis 
1. Activism and Ownership Structure 
Figure 1 and Table 1 below summarize the results of my 
examination. Figure 1 plots the percentage of all Russell 
3000 companies in 2014 that were subject to at least one 
activist event during the sampled period as a function of 
their insider ownership percentage. For each category of 
“insider ownership” (up to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30%, 
etc.), the “% of Targets” presents the percentage of targets 
subject to at least one activist event during the sampled 
period out of the total number of targets in the sample (654 
companies), while the “Adjusted % of Targets” presents an 
adjusted percentage, controlling for the number of companies 
in the Russell 3000 Index in this category (such adjustment 
is required as companies with low insider ownership are 
more prevalent in the Index). For instance, 70.6% of the 
activist events were deployed against companies where 
 
could exercise effective control over a company by holding less than 30% of 
the voting rights. See, e.g., In re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 
C.A. 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014) (determining 
that a 17.5% stockholder could be deemed a controller). A Delaware court 
has also held that “there is no absolute percentage of voting power that is 
required in order for there to be a finding that a controlling stockholder 
exists.” In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 
2403999, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006). Instead, the Court considers 
whether or not the dominant stockholder “exercises ‘such formidable 
voting and managerial power that [it], as a practical matter, [is] no 
differently situated than if [it] had majority voting control.’” In re Morton’s 
Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 665 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting 
In re PNB). See also In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 
(Del. Ch. 2003); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 
53, 70 (Del. 1989). For another academic study using a 30% cutoff, see 
Erede, supra note 65. For studies using lower cutoff, see La Porta et al., 
supra note 50; Faccio & Lang, supra note 50. 
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insider ownership is up to 10% of the outstanding common 
shares, but when controlling for the number of Russell 3000 
companies in 2014 in this category, the percentage goes 
down to 27.7% (meaning that 27.7% of the firms where 
insiders own up to 10% of the outstanding shares have been 
subject to activism). 
 
Figure 1: Activism and Insider Ownership 
As expected, the likelihood of a company being subject to 
an activist intervention is negatively associated with the 
“insider ownership” variable. As ownership becomes more 
concentrated, the number of target companies declines 
dramatically. However, as reflected in Figure 1, when 
adjusted for the number of companies in each category of 
insider ownership, the differences in the intensity of activist 
events between the different insider ownership categories 
become smaller. 
Table 1 compares activist engagements in controlled 
companies to those that are widely held, while controlling for 
the number of widely held and controlled companies in the 
Russell 3000 Index as of 2014. As Table 1 shows, the 
likelihood that a controlled company will face an activist 
event is indeed lower than that of a widely held company. 
Only 14.9% of the controlled companies that were on the 
Russell 3000 Index in 2014 faced at least one activist event 
during the sampled period compared to 26.5% of the widely 
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held companies.85 Interestingly however, although the 
increase in ownership concentration reduces the likelihood of 
activism, controlled companies are not fully insulated from 
activist interventions, and the total number of companies 
subject to activism is not negligible. I also explored the 
difference in the intensity of activism between widely held 
firms and controlled firms that have a dual-class share 
structure, a control-enhancing mechanism that is often used 
by U.S. controllers.86 As Table 2 shows, when I focus on this 
subset of controlled firms, the differences in the intensity of 
activist events between widely held and controlled 
companies become even smaller. Some 20.3% of all dual-class 
firms that were on the Russell 3000 Index in 2014 
experienced at least one activist event during the sampled 
period compared to 26.5% of the widely held companies. In 
the next Part, I will explore the main cause behind the 
relatively high percentage of engagements with dual-class 
firms, and will show that is often facilitated by a formal right 
that certain dual-class firms grant minority shareholders. 
 
Table 1: Activism with Widely Held and Controlled 
Companies 
 
 Widely Held 
Companies  
Controlled 




No. of Companies  
in the Index 
2173 529 236 
No. of Targets                     
(as % of Companies  
in the Index) 
575  
(26.5%) 




    
 
85 This finding is also in line with a recent study on shareholder 
activism in the United States, showing that stock liquidity increases the 
probability of activism. See Oyvind Norli, Charlotte Ostergaard & Ibolya 
Schindele, Liquidity and Shareholder Activism, REV. FIN. STUD. 3 
(forthcoming 2015). 
86 See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, this lack of absolute protection from 
activism becomes even more pronounced when looking at 
historical engagements with controlled targets that were 
included in the Russell 3000 index in previous years. As 
noted earlier, such review yields a sample of over 200 activist 
events with 110 targets. In sum, while controlled companies 
do enjoy some immunity from activist interventions, the data 
clearly show that this immunity is only partial. Activist 
players do target controlled companies as well, and this 
activity is far from trivial.87 
2. Different Type of Activism? 
The previous Subpart showed that activists are also 
showing up at a non-negligible number of controlled 
companies, but this raw data does not tell us anything about 
the nature of those activist engagements. One could 
rightfully argue that engagements with controlled companies 
may differ substantially from those with widely held firms. 
For instance, activists engaging with controlled companies 
may primarily focus on governance changes, use only low-
profile, collaborative strategies to achieve their goals, or pick 
easier targets. This Subpart examines these alternative 
hypotheses, using the Full Sample of activist engagements 
with controlled firms. 
 
87 One could argue the lower percentage of activist campaigns in 
controlled companies is not necessarily a direct result of an increased 
insulation due to their ownership structure, but instead a result of other 
factors. For instance, controlled companies might be less attractive targets 
if they are better managed than widely held companies, offering activists 
limited value-creating opportunities. In Part VI, I address this claim, 
showing it is unlikely that the entire decline in the level of activism is not 
associated, at least partially, with the ownership structure constraints. In 
particular, I argue that the mediocre performance of dual-class firms or 
family firms controlled by heirs of founders, as evidenced by numerous 
studies, suggests that a large number of controlled companies should be 
suitable targets for activism, assuming activism was not discouraged by 
ownership structure. 
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(i) Different Type of Activist Engagements? Some may 
think that most activist engagements with controlled 
companies are low-profile, non-hostile engagements, in 
which activists quietly persuade controllers to voluntarily 
accept their position. This possibility, however, is not 
supported by the data. I found that 31% of all open 
engagements are hostile (hostility includes a threatened or 
actual proxy contest or a lawsuit). This percentage of hostile 
interactions is similar to the one documented by Brav et al., 
using a sample of more than 1000 engagements.88 
Additionally, 27% of the public engagements are openly 
confrontational, although without reaching the level of a 
proxy fight. 
I also rebut the possibility that activism in controlled 
companies is limited to governance-related matters. A review 
of all activists’ demands shows that only 34% of them were 
related to the improvement of corporate governance 
provisions of the targets.89 Activists, as I demonstrate in Part 
VI, are often dissatisfied with the way controllers manage 
their businesses, and a large number of their demands are 
related to core business and financial matters, such as 
demands to divest assets, initiate a capital restructuring, 
return cash via dividends or buybacks, review strategic 
alternatives, seek or block mergers, and so on. Occasionally, 
activist demands sought to influence the controlled 
companies from within via board representation (17% of the 
demands). 
Finally, I found that the average ownership interest held 
by the activist (or a group of activists acting in concert) at 
the announcement of the campaign is 8.4%. These are not 
low-cost engagements. In fact, activists had to incur 
substantial costs while accumulating a non-negligible 
ownership stake in target companies. 
 
88 Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 15, at 1744. 
89 The information on activists’ demands was collected from 
SharkWatch. The governance-related demands include, amongst others, 
demands to add independent directors, remove directors or officers, 
remove takeover defenses, and compensation-related enhancements. 
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(ii)  Different Type of Activist Players? I examined the 
identity of the activists to confirm that the evidence on 
activism in controlled companies is not biased due to a high 
percentage of non-traditional activist investors who are less 
aware of the high risk involved in engaging with controlled 
companies. The data rebuts this possibility, showing that the 
vast majority of engagements in my Full Sample (86%) are 
conducted by the common activist players: hedge funds, 
activist investment advisors (such as GAMCO Asset 
Management, Southeastern Asset Management, and 
Franklin Mutual Advisers), and other financial institutions. 
Moreover, the activists in charge of 46% of the engagements 
in the Full Sample are included in the SharkWatch50 list (a 
list of fifty significant activist investors maintained by 
SharkWatch). Only 9% of the engagements are conducted by 
individuals, and the remaining 5% by corporations and other 
stakeholders. 
(iii) Picking Easier Targets? Finally, it could be argued 
that activists will focus on “easier” targets—controlled 
companies whose controllers hold between 30% and 40% of 
the voting rights. This claim is also not supported by the 
data. Table 2 shows that the majority of the engagements 
(57%) in the Full Sample are with companies where the 
controlling shareholders hold at least 50% of the voting 
rights. This result stays largely the same even when I focus 
on unique engagements and exclude subsequent related 
activist events from the Full Sample.90 I also found that 
engagements with companies where the controlling 
shareholders hold at least the majority of voting rights have 
only a slightly lower success rate than engagements with 
companies whose controllers hold only 30% to 40% of the 
voting rights. As I show in the next Part, those successful 
engagements with fully controlled firms are often facilitated 
 
90 When activist X and activist Y target the same company around the 
same matter, but they do not act as a group, they have to file separate SC 
13Ds. SharkWatch will count this interaction as two separate events. As 
the multiple engagements are often related, I count them, under this 
category, as one event to confirm the data is not biased. 
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by certain formal rights that increase activists’ bargaining 
power. 
 





CS                      
(30–40%) 
CS                
(40–50%) 
CS                      
(50% or more) 
No. of 
Engagements 
209 (100%) 59 (29%) 30 (14%) 120  (57%) 
Success Rate91 37.3% 40.7% 15% 40% 
 
In sum, this Part presents data on the intensity and 
nature of hedge fund activism in controlled companies. It 
shows that activist shareholders are also showing up at a 
non-negligible number of controlled firms (although 
controlled companies are still more insulated from activism 
than widely held companies), and that these activist 
engagements are not substantially different in their nature 
from activism conducted in widely held companies. These 
unexpected findings trigger a question that stands at the 
heart of the Article: What mechanisms do activist hedge 
funds use when engaging with controlled companies? The 
next two Parts provide answers to this question. 
IV. THE FORMAL CHANNELS OF ACTIVISM 
To explore the main channels through which hedge fund 
activism is deployed against controlled companies, I closely 
reviewed 174 activist engagements against eighty-three 
controlled companies that were included in my Full Sample, 
and that had publicly disclosed the purpose of the activist 
engagement (the “Sample of Publicly-disclosed 
Engagements”). In many instances, activists’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the controllers was not as limited as initially 
 
91 An engagement is considered a successful one if one or more of the 
activist’s demands is accepted by the target. Success rate is calculated as 
percentage of all unique engagements for which the results were publicly 
available.  
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anticipated. In particular, activists took advantage of a host 
of legal mechanisms, such as the ability to elect minority 
directors, veto certain M&A transactions initiated by the 
controller, or conduct activism in the shadow of litigation, 
which allow them to exert pressure on a controller. Table 3 
below provides a breakdown of activist engagements by each 
of these categories. 
 








Minority Directors in Dual-Class Firms93  47 27% 
Minority Directors in  
Effectively-Controlled Firms  
51 29% 
Veto Rights in Going-private Transactions 24 14% 
Lawsuits 8 5% 
No Formal Channels 38 22% 
Other 7 4% 
Total  174 100% 
 
 
92 The percentage stays substantially the same even when I focus on 
unique engagements and exclude subsequent related activist events from 
the Sample of Publicly-disclosed Engagements. 
93 This row includes all activist engagements with companies that 
provide minority shareholders with the ability to nominate and elect 
minority representatives to the board (regardless of whether or not such 
right is used by the activist). In more than 60% of these engagements 
(excluding related ones), the activists nominated or explicitly threatened 
to nominate their own candidates to the board, or at least tried to block 
the nomination of the controllers’ representatives to the slate of directors 
appointed by minority shareholders. 
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A. The Right to Nominate and Elect Minority 
Directors 
1. Dual-class Firms 
Public shareholders in certain U.S. dual-class firms have 
the ability to nominate and elect minority representatives to 
the board. Although this mechanism has received little 
attention from legal scholars in the past, it is an important 
channel through which activism can be deployed in 
controlled U.S. firms. As shown in Table 3, this mechanism 
accounted for 27% of the Sample of Publicly-disclosed 
Engagements with controlled companies (forty-seven activist 
engagements), and it generated a high success rate.94 
There are essentially two types of controlled companies 
with a dual-class structure: companies where the controlling 
shareholder maintains control over the firm’s voting rights 
through the use of shares with superior voting rights, and 
companies where the controlling shareholder has the right to 
elect a majority of the board, without necessarily controlling 
the majority of the company’s voting rights, and the 
remaining directors are elected by other public shareholders. 
While the second type of dual-class structure enables a 
controller to elect the majority of the board without regard to 
its total voting power, that controller is still more vulnerable 
to activist attacks because activists have the ability to 
nominate and elect a short slate of directors. This bargaining 
mechanism, in turn, increases the ex ante incentives of 
activists to engage with controlled companies. 
Although the election of the activist’s director nominees to 
the board does not jeopardize the controller’s ability to 
determine the company’s business strategy, the mere 
presence of an outsider in the boardroom may change board 
dynamics.95 This outside director, who is truly independent 
 
94 See Table 4. 
95 See, e.g., Yael Bizouati, Activists Make More News: Two firms push 
for board seats at the New York Times, INV. DEALERS’ DIG. (Feb. 4, 2008) 
(quoting sources close to the activist hedge funds that engaged with The 
New York Times Company saying: “Change can happen with only one 
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of the controller and does not depend on the controller to be 
re-elected, has the right to access the company’s books and 
records96 and cannot be excluded from the board’s intimate 
discussions (unless there is a direct, readily-apparent conflict 
of interest between the minority director and the 
controller).97 A minority director can also spot conflict of 
interest transactions, challenge the controller with difficult 
questions, bring additional information and perspective to or 
from the boardroom to the activist shareholder who 
appointed him, and in non-hostile situations his voice and 
attitude with respect to the company’s strategic plans or 
payout policies could affect the other independent directors. 
In addition, when there is a lawsuit of any kind, the minority 
director could be a “bad” witness for other directors, which in 
turn could increase the transparency of board discussions. 
Therefore, activists’ reliable threat to elect a short slate of 
directors, and the concern from the presence of one or more 
“outside” directors on the board, may make controllers more 
attentive to activists’ demands. 
The activist campaign against The New York Times 
Company, presented in the beginning of this Article, was 
facilitated by the activists’ ability to nominate minority 
directors. While the Times Company is controlled by the 
Sulzberger family through their ownership of Class B shares, 
allowing them to elect nine of the thirteen total board seats, 
shareholders unaffiliated with the controllers have the 
ability to elect the remaining four directors, and through this 
channel the activists put pressure on the controlling family. 
 
member on the board . . . . This is not a numbers game, but a blend of who 
has the most experience and gravitas, and who works more.”). 
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2011) (“Any director shall have the 
right to examine the corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders 
and its other books and records for a purpose reasonably related to the 
director’s position as a director”). See also J. Travis Laster & John Mark 
Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. 
LAW. 33, 44–47 (2015). 
97 Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 96, at 33, 42–44, 59–60. 
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But The New York Times Company is not the only 
controlled company that has this arrangement in place.98 
Another interesting example is the engagement with 
Dillard’s, Inc., an upscale department store chain. The 
engagement started in the middle of 2007, when Barington 
Capital Group, L.P., a minority holder in Dillard’s, Inc., sent 
a series of letters to the company, expressing its extreme 
disappointment at the company’s poor operational 
performance and corporate governance.99 According to 
Barington, the company’s loss for the second quarter of 2007 
was the largest loss since 1992, and Dillard’s, which was a 
thriving franchise under the leadership of its founder, lost 
approximately $2 billion in market capitalization since his 
heirs had taken over in 1998.100 As the pressure increased, 
the company announced in late 2007 a new plan to 
 
98 See, e.g., the successful engagements with targets such as 
Cablevision, Dow Jones, Emmis Communications, Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc., Media General, Inc., Stewart Information Services Corporation, TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corporation, Telephone and Data Systems, Inc., 
United States Cellular Corporation, and Whitney Information Network, 
Inc. I collected data on these engagements from the SharkRepellent 
database. See Factset Research Systems, Inc., SHARKREPELLENT.NET, 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/5DXG-7TPE]. 
99 See Press Release, Barington Capital Group, L.P., Barington 
Capital Group Seeks to Maximize Shareholder Value at Dillard’s, Inc. 
(June 28, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/barington-
capital-group-seeks-to-maximize-shareholder-value-at-dillards-inc-
58531067.html [https://perma.cc/R4GQ-JK6U]; Press Release, Barington 
Capital Group, L.P., Barington Capital Group Continues to Seek to 




100 A report by the Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) supports 
this view, revealing that Dillard’s had the second worst corporate 
governance profile of the 500 companies in the S&P 500 index. See Press 
Release, Barington Capital Group, L.P., Barington Capital Group 
Questions the Commitment of Dillard’s to the Company's Public 
Stockholders (Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ 
barington-capital-group-questions-the-commitment-of-dillards-to-the-comp 
anys-public-stockholders-58629562.html [http://perma.cc/PB2K-ZFSD]. 
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repurchase up to $200 million of its shares held by minority 
holders.101 
This was not enough. The activist player, who used its 
ability to nominate a minority director as a bargaining 
chip,102 kept pushing for change. In early 2008, the activist 
joined forces with other funds and insisted that further steps 
be taken to increase shareholder value and to improve the 
company’s corporate governance.103 The dissident group also 
gave formal notice to the company of its intent to nominate a 
four-person slate for election at the 2008 annual meeting.104 
Shortly thereafter, a settlement was reached between the 
parties, and the company agreed to nominate four candidates 
proposed by the activists.105 Following this intervention, the 
family also took sizable cuts in compensation,106 and, 
suggesting the market’s support for these moves, Dillard’s 
shares surged 35%, the biggest one-day percentage gain in 
twenty-eight years.107 
One can rightfully ask why controllers would voluntarily 
adopt such a dual-class structure that allows minority 
shareholders to get their representatives on the board. The 
answer to this question relates to past restraints that major 
U.S. exchanges imposed on the use of dual-class 
structures.108 While the NYSE refused to list companies with 
a dual-class structure for approximately sixty years, up until 
 
101 Dillard’s, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 21, 2007). 
102 The heirs of the company’s founder control the election of eight out 
of twelve directors. Public shareholders elect the remaining four directors. 
See Dillard’s, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14-A) 5–6 (Apr. 22, 2008). 
103 Dillard’s, Inc., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13-D) (Jan. 29, 2008). 
104 Dillard’s, Inc., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13-D/A) (Mar. 19, 2008). 
105 Dillard’s, Inc., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13-D/A) (Apr. 3, 2008). 
106 Arnold J. Karr, Dillard Family Sees Compensation Drop in ‘08, 
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 22, 2009, at 14. 
107 Dillard’s Stock Up More Than 35 pct After Surprise Profit, 
REUTERS (May 18, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/dillards-stock-
idUSN1836930420090518 [https://perma.cc/FWR4-XHKX]. 
108 For a detailed account of the history of dual-class capitalization in 
the United States, see Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder 
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–707 (1986). 
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the mid-1980s,109 the AMEX adopted a more flexible policy 
with respect to disparate voting rights. In 1976, the AMEX 
agreed to list a dual-class firm, named Wang Laboratories, 
Inc., that went public with a structure that, among other 
things, grants holders of shares with inferior voting power 
the right to elect 25% of the board of directors.110 The AMEX 
subsequently published the essence of the prelisting 
understandings with Wang Laboratories in the form of a 
statement of policy, called the “Wang formula.”111 
After Wang and up until 1985 (when major U.S. stock 
exchanges relaxed their restrictions on dual-class stock), 
twenty-two dual-class firms that went public on the AMEX 
used this formula, and seven additional firms that had 
disproportionate voting rights before 1976 have recapitalized 
employing the Wang formula.112 Therefore, up until the mid-
1980s, controllers who wanted to use a dual-class structure 
in order to maintain control over the company even when 
they liquidated some of their position had no choice but to 
provide public holders with the right to elect minority 
directors. Moreover, in this pre-activist era, controllers who 
adopted this special structure113 probably did not anticipate 
that activist investors would ever take advantage of it to 
launch campaigns against them.114 Upon the rise of activism, 
 
109 Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The 
Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 807–08 (1987). 
110 Seligman, supra note 108, at 704 n.90. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. See also M. Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited 
Voting Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 313 
(1987) (examining forty-four publicly traded firms that created a class of 
limited voting common stock during 1962–1984, and showing that in 
thirty-four cases each class separately elects a certain percentage of the 
board of directors, which reflects AMEX guidelines). 
113 Note that most of the controlled companies that adopted this 
special dual-class structure did so before 2005, when the phenomenon of 
hedge fund activism gained steam. See infra note 212. 
114 For instance, when activist holders engaged with The Times 
Company in 2008, it was the first time the company’s directors were ever 
nominated by shareholders unaffiliated with management. See Richard 
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this special dual-class structure became an important 
channel of activism, and companies that adopted this 
structure were twice as likely to be subject to an activist 
intervention than a dual-class company without any special 
arrangement. A review of a sample of 193 dual-class firms 
shows that 43% of all dual-class firms that grant public 
shareholders the right to nominate a minority director 
experienced at least one activist event during the sample 
period compared to 20% of all dual class firms without such 
structure.115 
This relationship between shareholder activism and the 
ability of activist holders to elect minority directors is also 
supported by evidence from Italy, where a regulation passed 
in 2007 allowed minority holders to appoint their own 
directors via proportional voting.116 Matteo Erede, who 
researches shareholder activism in Italy, shows that hedge 
funds have actively intervened in half of the elections in 
Italian-listed companies that are subject to the 2007 
regulation, which allows minority holders to appoint their 
own directors.117 
2. Effectively-controlled Firms 
Activists may also threaten to challenge an “effective” 
controller, who owns less than 50% of the voting power, by 
seeking board representation despite the low ex ante chances 
of winning a proxy fight against an effective controller. 
 
Pérez-Peña, Investor to Step Down From Times Co. Board, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK, Feb. 19, 2010, at B8. 
115 Data on dual-class firms is as of 2012 and was taken from 
SharkRepellent. Information on the ability to elect minority directors was 
hand-collected. The sample includes 60 dual-class firms that grant public 
shareholders the right to nominate a minority director and 133 dual-class 
firms without such structure. 
116 Erede, supra note 65, at 359. 
117 Id. at 358–59. 82.5% of these Italian targets are controlled ones. 
See also Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 64, at 21–23, 30 (noting that 
hedge funds and mutual funds have submitted slate voting for corporate 
bodies on various occasions). 
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Controllers are often incentivized to partially liquidate 
their equity position below the 50% threshold, as it enables 
them to diversify their holdings, reduce their idiosyncratic 
risk, and raise new capital while still controlling their 
companies.118 In the ordinary course of business, 
maintaining between 30% and 50% of the voting rights 
should allow controllers to exercise effective control. This is 
especially true considering retail investors’ rational apathy 
problem, and their tendency to avoid voting.119 Consider a 
situation where the largest shareholder owns 35% of the 
firm’s voting rights and 15% of the investors avoid voting. In 
such a case, an activist nominee needs to attract the support 
of more than 70% of the public shareholders not affiliated 
with the controller in order to be elected.120 Moreover, in 
order to pass a shareholder proposal with a simple majority 
vote, an activist has to receive the support of all 
shareholders not affiliated with the controller.121 
However, an activist engagement against an effectively 
controlled company is not necessarily a lost cause. 
Controllers’ effective control may be challenged, but only if 
the activist receives the overwhelming support of 
shareholders unaffiliated with the controller.122 Since there 
 
118 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply 
to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 749 (1986); Gilson, 
supra note 109, at 812. 
119 See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” 
Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 40 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 8) (showing that in 2014, 24% of the 
shares in the S&P 500 were not voted). 
120 The public float after excluding the controller’s stake (35%) and 
the shares held by shareholders who do not exercise their vote (15%) is 
50%. Since the activist has to receive at least 35.1% of the votes in order to 
win the contested election, it will need the support of approximately 70% 
of the shareholders not affiliated with the controller (35.1/50). 
121 Since the public float after excluding the controller’s stake and 
non-voting shares is 50%, all shareholders will have to support the 
proposal so that it will pass. 
122 The chances of a successful challenge depend on certain factors, 
including investors’ turnout rate at the annual meeting, the size of the 
activist’s stake, and the controller’s ownership percentage. As the 
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is some uncertainty regarding both the turnout rate among 
institutional and retail investors and how they will exercise 
their vote, it is difficult to determine ex ante whether a 
campaign will succeed. Concerns that effective control will be 
contested in a perfect-storm scenario, as well as the potential 
damage to controller’s reputation,123 could push a controller 
to accept activists’ demands, even when the actual chances of 
a campaign’s success are low. 
The activist engagement with Comcast in 2008 
exemplifies this point. Although the Roberts family holds 
33% of the outstanding voting rights,124 the family’s effective 
control over Comcast could not be easily contested. In the 
four-year period prior to the engagement, all twenty-three 
shareholder proposals that were submitted to the company 
failed.125 This data suggests that the chances of an activist 
shareholder winning a proxy fight against the Roberts family 
were ostensibly low, but the mere existence of some 
possibility of challenging the controlling family put pressure 
on the company and motivated it to accept some of the 
activist’s demands. Indeed, as a result of the engagement, 
Comcast agreed to pay a quarterly dividend—its first 
dividend since 1999—and to utilize its remaining $6.9 billion 
share repurchase authorization by the end of 2009.126 In 
addition, the company eliminated a controversial benefit to 
 
controller’s stake increases from 30% to 50%, the likelihood to win a proxy 
fight decreases. 
123 See the discussion in Part V, infra. 
124 Comcast Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) 5 (Mar. 17, 2008) 
(stating that the shares beneficially owned by Mr. Brian L. Roberts 
represent 33.33% of the combined voting power of the company). 
125 Most of those proposals were governance- or compensation-related 
proposals that usually receive strong shareholder support. The data on 
shareholder proposals submitted to Comcast was collected from the 
SharkRepellent database. See Factset Research Systems, Inc., 
SHARKREPELLENT.NET, https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/5D 
XG-7TPE]. 
126 Comcast Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 1 (Feb. 14, 2008). 
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the estate of the company founder upon his death, and 
reduced bonuses for certain executive officers.127 
Finally, activist engagements with controlled companies 
could also be motivated by the existence of a second-largest 
holder who opposes the controller and who could create a 
coalition with the activist to facilitate the engagement. In 
this type of situation, although the controlling shareholder 
exercises an effective control over the company by holding 
30% (or more) of the voting rights, its effective control could 
more easily be contested due to the existence of an additional 
holder with a substantial ownership percentage. This 
dynamic is particularly common when there is a dispute 
between the company’s major holders and the activist takes 
advantage of this conflict to co-operate with one side.128 
More generally, as Table 3 shows, 29% of the 
engagements in the Sample of Publicly-disclosed 
Engagements were with controlled companies whose 
controllers exercised effective control,129 and the activists 
had no ability to press controllers through other legal 
 
127 Id. Another interesting example is the activist engagement with 
Barnes & Noble that is controlled by the Riggio family. In March 2010, 
after being subject to continuing pressure by Yucaipa American 
Management, the company removed its CEO and a member of the 
controlling family, Stephen Riggio. Barnes & Noble, Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) 1 (Mar. 18, 2010). Later on, although Yucaipa’s proxy fight 
failed, Barnes & Noble, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 1 (Oct. 13, 2010), 
the pressure on Barnes & Noble continued in subsequent activist 
campaigns; one of them urged the company to spin off its Nook business, 
and indeed in April 2012, the company agreed to sell a 17.6% stake in the 
Nook business to Microsoft. Barnes & Noble, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K) 1 (Dec. 28, 2012). 
128 Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 64, at 25–27 (describing examples 
where the control block is scattered among members of the controlling 
group and the dispute between them triggers the activist engagements). 
Notable examples include the activist engagements with Benihana Inc., 
Morgans Hotel Group Co., Private Media Group, Inc., and Synovics 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. I collected data on these engagements from the 
SharkRepellent database. See Factset Research Systems, supra note 125. 
129 I define an effective controller as a controller who holds up to 45% 
of the voting rights. Such controller is practically entrenched since the 
average shareholder turnout at the sampled companies is lower than 90%. 
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channels. In 45% of the cases (excluding related ones), the 
activists sought board representation or asked to add an 
independent director. Board seats were granted in 
approximately half of these challenges, with all but two cases 
settled in advance. 
B. Minority’s Veto Power in Going-private 
Transactions 
Activism in connection with public merger and acquisition 
(“M&A”) transactions has long been an important channel 
through which activists generate returns for their 
investors.130 The main M&A-related strategies involve 
directly challenging an announced deal in an effort to extract 
a higher price from the purchaser or defeating a transaction 
at a price that significantly undervalues the shares held by 
the public shareholders. Those strategies prove effective 
even in the context of controlled companies, mostly when a 
going-private transaction needs to be approved by a majority 
of minority shareholders. Such veto power provides activist 
investors with the ability to extract a higher deal premium 
from a controlling shareholder or block a merger at a 
depressed offering price. 
In certain jurisdictions, such as Delaware, controllers are 
not required by law to get the approval of the majority of 
minority shareholders before consummating a conflicted 
going-private transaction. However, Delaware courts 
incentivize controllers to seek such approval. Until recently, 
an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders 
shifted the burden of proof under the “entire fairness” 
standard from the defendant to the plaintiff,131 and a recent 
 
130 See, e.g., Greenwood & Schor, supra note 38; Morrison & Foerster 
LLP, Activist Hedge Funds Find Ways to Profit from M&A Transactions, 




131 Where a transaction involving self-dealing by a controlling 
stockholder is challenged at court, the applicable standard of judicial 
review is “entire fairness,” with the defendants having the burden of 
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Delaware decision in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. 
(“MFW”) further intensified those incentives by allowing 
controllers who seek such approval (as well as approval by a 
well-functioning committee of independent directors) to 
avoid onerous entire fairness scrutiny and be subject instead 
to “business judgment” review.132 
Critics of MFW often argue that giving shareholders the 
additional protection of a majority-of-minority vote adds 
little value because shareholders who suffer from 
information asymmetry will always vote for a good premium 
deal offered by the controller.133 This criticism, however, 
misses an important implication of MFW: its potential 
indirect impact on hedge fund activism. Even if most 
minority shareholders lack the ability to gather information 
and closely analyze the suggested deal terms, the use of a 
legal rule that incentivizes controllers to provide minority 
holders with veto power over conflicted transactions allows 
activist shareholders to extract a higher premium in going-
private transactions (usually suspected to be conducted at a 
depressed price)134 to the benefit of all shareholders. Finally, 
 
persuasion. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 
1983); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997). However, 
until recently, approval by either a well-functioning committee of 
independent directors or an informed vote of a majority of the minority 
stockholders shifts the burden of proof under the entire fairness standard 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 
638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
132 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (holding 
that a controlling stockholder’s related party transaction will be subject to 
the business judgment rule if a proposed transaction receives both the 
affirmative recommendation of a (fully authorized and effectively 
functioning) special committee and approval by a majority of the minority 
stockholders). 
133 Id. at 643 (citing plaintiffs’ argument regarding minority investors’ 
tendency to sell their shares for a premium). 
134 For a theoretical analysis of this point, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Marcel Kahan, Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate 
Freezeouts, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2000). For evidence showing that when controllers do not have 
to seek the approval of majority of minority shareholders or of a special 
committee of independent directors the merger consideration to minority 
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even if the controller does not seek an approval by the 
majority of disinterested shareholders, an activist holder can 
still put pressure on the controller by seeking an appraisal 
remedy.135 This mere threat of litigation provides the activist 
player with additional bargaining power. 
The data include twenty-four M&A-related events, and 
this mechanism accounts for fourteen percent of the Sample 
of Public-disclosed Engagements. In most of the 
engagements with observable outcomes, the activists either 
forced controllers to sweeten the offering price or to modify 
the transaction terms in a way that benefitted all minority 
shareholders (58%), or they blocked a transaction at what 
they perceived as an undervalued price (34%).136 The high 
success rate of M&A-related engagements137 shows that the 
ability of minority shareholders to veto certain transactions 
is another important channel of activism in controlled 
companies. A notable recent example is the acquisition of 
Clearwire Corporation by one of its controlling shareholders, 
Sprint. The activist engagement in this acquisition led to a 
 
shareholders decreases, see Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-
Outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2007) (finding that 
minority shareholders receive lower cumulative abnormal returns in 
tender-offer freeze-outs that were not subject to entire fairness standard 
than in statutory merger freeze-outs). 
135 See Morrison & Foerster LLP, supra note 130. 
136 An interesting example is the engagement with the Dolan family, 
back in 2007, following the controlling family’s decision to take 
Cablevision private by acquiring the shares held by the public 
shareholders. The activist’s pressures led the Dolan Group to sweeten the 
offering price, from $27 to $36.25 per share. Eventually, although the 
Dolan Group controlled the majority of the company voting rights, the 
activist, who still thought that the deal price undervalued the minority 
holders’ shares, was successful in its efforts to block the transaction as the 
merger required the approval of a majority of the minority shareholders. 
See Press Release, Cablevision Systems Corporation, Cablevision 
Announces Preliminary Vote Results from Special Shareholders Meeting 
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20071024005915/ 
en/Cablevision-Announces-Preliminary-Vote-Results-Special-Shareholders 
[https://perma.cc/9VWW-HW63]. 
137 The activists’ demands were fully rejected in only 8% of these 
M&A-related engagements. 
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significant increase in the final purchase price from $2.90 
per share to $5.00 per share.138 
Minority protections in the context of public takeovers 
also play an important role in Germany, where there has 
been a noticeable increase in the frequency of activist 
engagements.139 In particular, activist hedge funds have 
begun to take advantage of certain provisions of the German 
Stock Corporation Law, which provides minority holders 
with the right to challenge the appropriateness of the 
consideration paid to them when being squeezed out 
pursuant to a domination agreement with a buyer who holds 
at least 75% of the share capital of a target. In recent years, 
this right serves as an important channel of activism for 
hedge funds, including United States-based funds such as 
Elliott Management.140 
C. Activism in the Shadow of Litigation 
An activist can also exert pressure on a controller by 
filing a lawsuit against a controlled company. Alternatively, 
once an activist campaign begins, the use of lawsuits can 
prevent a controller from taking advantage of its power to 
take unilateral steps against the activists.141 I documented 
 
138 See Michael J. de la Merced, Sprint Beats Dish’s Latest Bid for 
Clearwire, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK, June 21, 2013, at B6. 
139 See supra notes 67–70. 
140 See, e.g., Bessler et al., supra note 67; Morrison & Foerster LLP, 
Shareholder Activism in Germany, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (June 7, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/ 
07/shareholder-activism-in-germany/ [http://perma.cc/GL83-CTVR]. 
141 In a notable example, an activist filed a lawsuit for a breach of 
fiduciary duties against the directors of Syms Corp., a chain of “off-price” 
apparel stores with a controller who holds 56% of the voting rights, 
seeking to enjoin the board from taking unilateral steps and voluntarily 
delisting the company public shares from trading on the NYSE. This 
strategy worked, and a month later, the company announced it was 
reregistering its common stock with the SEC in light of significant 
activism. See Press Release, Barington Capital Group, L.P. and Esopus 
Creek Advisors LLC, Stockholder Group Urges Syms Corp not to 
Deregister or Delist Company’s Common Stock (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/stockholder-group-urges-syms-corp-not-to-
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eight engagements where activists filed, or threatened to file, 
lawsuits not in the M&A context discussed above, and they 
were successful in 37% of these cases. 
One of these cases was the engagement of Stilwell Group 
with Prudential Bancorp, Inc., a company whose controller 
holds 55% of the company’s voting power. Back in 2008, the 
activist filed a lawsuit against the company, seeking to 
remove a director that the activist thought was too old and ill 
to perform his duties properly, to hold the company directors 
personally responsible for costs associated with defending 
the lawsuit, and to stop the directors from attempting to self-
adopt stock benefit plans against the wishes of the 
shareholders.142 This pressure resulted in the director’s 
resignation and a settlement agreement pursuant to which 
the company agreed to commence a share repurchase 





This Part shows that activists’ bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the controllers is not as limited as initially anticipated. In 
particular, activists have enhanced power when they are 
able to nominate and elect minority directors or to veto 
certain M&A transactions initiated by the controllers. But 
what happens when public shareholders have no formal, 
legal mechanisms to facilitate engagements? To what extent 
could the reputational concerns of controlling shareholders 
replace the formal channels that facilitate activism? The 




142 Prudential Bancorp, Inc. of Pennsylvania, Schedule 13D (Form SC 
13D) 8–14 (May 19, 2008). 
143 See Jeff Blumenthal, Prudential Bancorp Director Quits Amid 
Insider Complaint, PHILA. BUS. J. (June 18, 2008), http://www.biz 
journals.com/philadelphia/stories/2008/06/23/newscolumn2.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5L3M-3N64]. 
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V. THE INFORMAL CHANNELS OF ACTIVISM 
While legal scholars have often emphasized the important 
role that informal channels—particularly reputational 
concerns of controlling shareholders—play in curbing 
controllers’ opportunism,144 there is little empirical evidence 
that examines this proposition. Engagements with controlled 
companies, and especially those where the control is 
uncontested, serve as an interesting setting to explore the 
potential impact of reputational concerns for two reasons. 
First, since activists have a limited ability to formally 
influence the decision-making of a fully controlled firm, one 
could assume that when activists do decide to target 
controlled companies, they are likely to rely more heavily on 
informal mechanisms. Second, controlling shareholders, who 
usually hold their position for a long period of time, are 
considered better targets for reputational sanctions than 
hired managers of widely held firms, as the former’s ability 
to influence the firm’s decision-making is sufficiently 
identifiable to investors and the public.145 To explore the 
potential rule of reputational forces, this Part conducts two 
main examinations. First, it reviews engagements when 
control is fully uncontested and activists have no other 
apparent formal bargaining mechanisms (“against all odds” 
engagements). Second, it examines engagements that receive 
particularly strong media coverage, and thus are likely to 
have a greater impact on the controller. 
A. Unbundling Controllers’ Reputational Concerns 
In general, the incentives of controllers to preserve their 
reputation stem from different sources. One source is the 
 
144 See infra notes 145–49. 
145 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing 
Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchanges, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636 
(2007); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 783–84, 815, 858 (2005) (arguing that 
controlling shareholders like Henry Ford who are heavily involved in the 
management of their firms are “the best locus of social and moral 
sanctions”). 
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potential damage to the public image or social standing of 
controllers as successful managers among their peers.146 
After all, senior managers and directors of large, public U.S. 
corporations make up a surprisingly small and close-knit 
community. Since those people know each other well, as 
Edward Rock suggests, they “apparently care about their 
reputation in the community.”147 A second related concern 
focuses on the potential damage to controllers’ reputation 
when treating minority shareholders unfairly. In that 
regard, a controller’s need to maintain “a positive image as 
an honest and moral dealer”148 may play an important role in 
reducing the risk of minority expropriation, causing 
controllers “to refrain from abusing the rights of the 
minority—even when no economic sanction is threatened.”149 
The third aspect of reputation markets is related to the 
public image of a controlled company among its consumers 
and the general public. For a company with a large consumer 
base, a campaign that publicly criticizes the company’s policy 
toward social and environmental issues could negatively 
impact its reputation and reduce the demand for its product. 
 
146 See, e.g., Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate 
Governance Role of the Media, in THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF THE 
MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT 107, 109, 122 (World Bank ed., 2002) (discussing 
the disciplinary power of media coverage on executives’ reputation); see 
also Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing 
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 865–66 (1993) 
(arguing that symbolic gesture of withholding votes could be enough of an 
embarrassment to motivate the board to take certain disciplinary action). 
147 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013–14 (1997). 
148 Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-
Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 425 (2003). 
149 Id. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country 
Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2175 (2001) (claiming that social 
norms do matter and constrain controllers to varying degrees); Ronald J. 
Gilson, supra note 145, at 648 (2007) (noting that some extraction of 
private benefits of control must be given up by the controller to signal 
minority shareholders that they will be treated fairly); Dyck & Zingales, 
supra note 24, at 576–79 (presenting the extra-legal institutions that help 
to curb private benefits of control by controlling shareholders). 
KASTIEL – FINAL 
106 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
Hedge fund campaigns, by and large, focus on the first 
two aspects of reputation markets. As such, the activists’ 
public statements often criticize controllers’ decision-making 
or highlight their abusive behavior toward minority 
shareholders. Of the 209 activist events in my Full Sample, 
only one campaign involved a social matter that was more 
likely to influence the perception of the target’s consumers. 
That was the campaign initiated by The Humane Society of 
the United States, advised by Carl Icahn, against Tyson 
Foods, one of the world’s largest processors and marketers of 
meat, which criticized the company’s treatment of animals.150 
The effectiveness of reputational markets also varies 
based on the type of sanction. For example, labor market 
sanctions151 do not play a meaningful disciplinary role in the 
context of controlled companies, as entrenched controllers (or 
directors nominated by them) are unlikely to face a real risk 
of removal even if they perform poorly.152 However, 
reputational sanctions could have a greater deterrent effect 
on a controlling shareholder than on a professional, hired 
manager when it comes to the financial damages caused by 
the decrease in the company share price. A negative 
campaign that successfully targets controllers’ skills or their 
attitude toward minority shareholders could result in a 
decreased firm share price. Since a controlling shareholder 
usually holds a larger equity stake in a target than a 
professional manager, they incur greater financial damages 
as a result of a drop in the firm share price.153 
 
150 Tyson Foods, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Oct. 2, 2012). 
151 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in 
the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1488 (2007). 
152 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A 
United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 
112 (1998). 
153 Note however that a significant number of controllers use control-
enhancing devices that allow them to maintain their control while holding 
only a small fraction of the equity interest (see infra note 185), and thus 
the financial damage that they incur would be lower in that scenario than 
in the case of a controller who does not use such devices. 
KASTIEL – FINAL 
No. 1:60] AGAINST ALL ODDS 107 
In sum, reputation markets could affect controlling 
shareholders in two different ways: either directly, by 
undermining the professional image of the controller in the 
business community, or indirectly, by depressing the target 
share price. The need to avoid (or mitigate) those 
reputational harms and the accompanying financial damages 
may, if reputation markets operate effectively, push 
controllers to be more attentive to activists’ demands, and 
put additional pressure on controllers to settle with activists, 
even in cases where the activists have no apparent formal 
bargaining power. 
B. The Role of Reputation in Encouraging Activism 
1. Activism Against All Odds 
To assess the potential impact of reputation markets, this 
Subpart focuses on the most extreme type of activism against 
controlled companies—engagements where the control is 
fully uncontested—and activists have no other formal 
bargaining mechanisms. I define “against all odds” 
engagements as ones that meet the following criteria: (i) the 
controlling shareholder exercises actual control over the firm 
by holding close to 50% (or more) of the firm’s voting rights, 
and (ii) the activists have no ability to elect minority 
directors or veto related-party transactions, nor do they have 
an apparent legal claim against the company. 
This setting of “against all odds” activism sheds an 
interesting light on the role reputational and extra-legal 
forces play by disentangling the impact of reputation from 
other formal forces. If one assumes that reputational 
concerns, when operating alone, are not effective enough in 
disciplining controllers, then one would not expect to see any 
engagements with companies that meet the above-mentioned 
criteria, nor would one expect that the controlling 
shareholder would be attentive to the demands of activists 
when the engagement is done against all odds. 
I documented thirty-eight “against all odds” activist 
engagements with controlled companies, accounting for 22% 
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of the Sample of Publicly-disclosed Engagements.154 It is 
difficult to know what exactly motivated the activists to start 
an engagement when they had no apparent formal 
bargaining mechanisms.155 However, since the vast majority 
of these cases involved public criticism of the governance or 
business strategy of the controlled companies,156 it may well 
be the case that reputational concerns or other extra-legal 
pressures motivated these “against all odds” engagements.157 
Moreover, in a handful of these “against all odds” 
engagements, controllers agreed to some of the activists’ 
demands to nominate independent directors,158 distribute 
 
154 The percentage is calculated out of 174 engagements included in 
the Sample of Publicly-disclosed Engagements. 
155 At any rate, even when the engagements have limited scope and 
they include only a public letter to the board (and a few engagements in 
my Full Sample were of that fashion), the activists still have to incur 
significant costs associated with identifying potential targets and 
accumulating a large equity position. 
156 Approximately 78% of these “against all odds” engagements 
(excluding related ones to avoid biases) included a public criticism of the 
controllers. In those cases, activists urged the targets to initiate strategic 
alternatives (nine events), to appoint directors recommended by the 
activists (seven events), to return cash to shareholders (six events), and to 
improve governance practices and remove takeover defenses (six events). 
157 In only six of the “against all odds” engagements, the activists 
either did not disclose the purpose of the engagement or used relatively 
neutral language in their public statements without directly criticizing the 
controller. Standing out in that regard is the activist hedge fund ValueAct, 
which is known for the use of soft activism. ValueAct managed to appoint 
its nominees to the boards of three different targets whose controllers held 
more than 50% of the voting rights. See Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc., Schedule 13D (SC 13D) (Jan. 18, 2002); Allison 
Transmission Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 15, 2014); 
Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 31, 
2008). However, since its communications with the targets are not publicly 
disclosed it is impossible to know whether the decision to accept activists’ 
demands was motivated by reputational concerns or by other reasons, 
such as the controller’s true belief that the activists’ plan could increase 
the share value. 
158 An interesting example in that regard is the high-profile 
engagement with Meredith Corporation, a media conglomerate. Back in 
2001, the activist, Franklin Mutual Advisers, expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the excessive management compensation, the overall performance of 
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additional dividends,159 and enhance governance 
standards,160 even though the activists had no apparent 
bargaining mechanism. The desire to put an end to public 
activists’ interventions focusing on the targets’ problematic 
management or governance practices may have motivated 
controllers to be more attentive to shareholders’ demands in 
those cases. 
Despite those few successful examples, the overall 
disciplinary effect of reputational forces as they relate to the 
implementation of activists’ demands is fairly limited. As 
reflected in Table 4 below, the implementation rate of 
activists’ demands is substantially higher in cases where the 
activists use a formal bargaining mechanism in addition to 
the reputational threat than it is in just “against all odds” 
cases. This disparity suggests that when activists have no 
formal bargaining chip, such as the ability to elect board 
 
the board, and “chronic undervaluation” of the target, and recommended 
certain strategic changes and the nomination of directors with financial 
expertise. This pressure bore fruit. In 2001, Meredith named one dissident 
member to its board and its stock price jumped about 50% during the 
three-year period following the intervention. See Franklin Mutual 
Advisers, LLC, Schedule 13D (SC 13D) (Jan. 31, 2001); Meredith Is Urged 
To Split Operations By a Big Investor, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 1, 2001, at B7. In 
another case, Calamos Asset Management, Inc., a majority-controlled 
company, decided, following an activist campaign that took place in 2012, 
to add two new independent directors, to increase its quarterly dividend, 
and to announce a three million share repurchase program. See Calamos 
Asset Management, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Aug. 28, 2012); 
Calamos Asset Management, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Feb. 4, 
2013). 
159 See Calamos Asset Management, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
2 (Feb. 4, 2013). 
160 In 2005, an activist holder sent public letters to NASDAQ, 
criticizing the poor corporate governance of Alico, Inc. and the conflict of 
interest between the company chair’s responsibilities at Alico and another 
private company that owned 48% of Alico. See Alico, Inc., Schedule 13D 
(SC 13D) (Mar. 1, 2005). Following those pressures, the target disclosed a 
new outline of Governance Standards, which included the resignations of 
directors with ties to the parent board, the separation of the positions of 
Chairman and CEO of Alico, and the commitment that the parent 
company will not raise its ownership interest in Alico to more than 55%. 
See Alico, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 22, 2005). 
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members or to veto certain transactions, controllers are more 
likely to ignore their demands.161 
 
















51% 39% 83% 37% 11%                   
 
The results presented in Table 4 are further corroborated 
by running a linear probability regression, presented in 
Table 5, where success of an engagement is the dependent 
variable (1=at least one of the activist’s demands is accepted; 
0=all activist’s demands are rejected) and the existence or 
non-existence of a formal bargaining mechanism is the 
independent variable (0=activist engagement with no formal 
bargaining mechanism; 1=engagement with a formal 
bargaining mechanism). I found that non-existence of a 
formal bargaining mechanism produces a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the probability that an 
activist’s demand is accepted (Column 1) after controlling for 
the target firms’ industry and market value as well as for the 
size of the activist investor, by adding a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the activist investor is included in the 
SharkWatch50 List (a list of the fifty largest activist 
 
161 The weakness of reputational markets as a substitute mechanism 
is further corroborated by the use of a relatively elaborative approach to 
reputational channels in Table 4, categorizing every activist engagement 
with no apparent formal bargaining mechanism as affected by 
reputational channels. In reality these engagements could be motivated by 
other reasons, which will further reduce the impact of reputation. 
162 An event is counted as successful when at least one of the activist’s 
demands is accepted. 
163 The three activist engagements with ValueAct, which were settled 
without publicly disclosing any information, were excluded from the 
calculation, but even when including them in the list the success rate 
remains below 20%.  
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investors). In particular, as the result in Column 1 shows, 
the probability of an activist campaign successfully achieving 
at least one engagement outcome without any formal 
bargaining mechanism is 39.9% lower than it is for an 
activist intervention with a formal bargaining mechanism. 
Reputational and extra-legal forces are therefore far from a 
perfect substitute for formal bargaining mechanisms. 
This result remains notably similar when I conduct a 
number of robustness checks. These checks include 
controlling for company performance during the three-year 
period that preceded the engagement (Columns 2 and 4), 
focusing only on unique engagements by counting multiple 
13D fillings submitted by different activists as one 
engagement if the fillings were made in connection with the 
same event (Columns 3 and 4), and eliminating from the 
sample all governance and board representation demands, 




164 The results for value/strategic demands engagements stayed 
substantially the same even when I limited the sample to unique 
engagements. As an additional robustness check, I re-ran the regressions 
using a different dependent variable, which accounts for the percentage of 
successful demands out of the total demands raised by the activists, and 
the coefficients stayed statistically significant. I also conducted the same 
experiment using logit instead of linear regressions, and the results 
remained similar. 
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Table 5: Results of Regressions 
This Table reports coefficients of linear probability regressions where 
the dependent variable is “Successful Engagement,” a binary variable 
equal to 1 if at least one of the activist’s demands is accepted by a 
controlled company. Control variables for all regressions include company 
industry and “ln(Market Cap),” defined as the logarithm of a firm’s market 
capitalization when an engagement starts, and a dummy variable for the 
inclusion of the activist investors in the SharkWatch50 List (a list of the 
fifty largest activist investors). Columns 2 and 4 include a control variable 
for company performance (“TSR3”), defined as the total shareholder return 
during the three-year period that preceded the activist engagement. 
Columns 3 and 4 include unique engagements only by counting multiple 
SC 13Ds as one event if they were filed in connection with the same 
activist engagement. Column 5 includes only engagements where 
value/strategic demands were raised by the activists. All standard errors 
(not reported) adjust for heteroskedasticity at the firm level. Finally, *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance of the coefficients at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 





-0.399*** -0.383*** -0.422*** -0.461*** -0.278**  
ln(Market Cap) 0.055** 0.049 0.060*** 0.050 0.096*** 
SharkWatch50  0.030 0.060 0.111 0.122 -0.000 
TSR3  -0.123  -0.161  
Industry Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant  0.574 0.608 0.566 0.681 0.554*** 
Observations 170 122 125 91 82 
Adjusted R2 0.0844 0.0411 0.106 0.0745 0.201 
 
2. The Reliance of Reputation on the Formal 
Channels 
In addition to “against all odds” engagements, I also 
investigated another subset of engagements that may shed 
more light on the operation of the reputational channels: 
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engagements receiving particularly strong media coverage.165 
When a hostile engagement becomes a high-profile one, it is 
more likely to attract the attention of investors and 
controllers’ business peers. Concerns about reputational 
harm can then motivate a controlling shareholder to be more 
attentive to activists’ demands in order to avoid or curtail a 
damaging public campaign. As a managing partner at a 
media-focused advisory firm industry summarized it: 
“[investors in controlled firms] may not be able to [influence 
the] vote, but they can buy big stakes in these companies and 
scream bloody murder if the stock declines continue. 
Eventually, something has got to give.”166 
Indeed, much anecdotal evidence suggests that 
controllers are motivated to terminate damaging campaigns, 
particularly when these campaigns attract strong media 
coverage. Consider, for instance, the engagement with The 
New York Times Company. As noted earlier, the Times 
Company’s decision to settle with the activists came after a 
three-month high-profile assault on the company,167 and 
after another activist investor, Morgan Stanley Investment 
Management, led a vocal two-year campaign for changes in 
the company business,168 publicly explaining that the 
company share price was deeply underpriced because of 
improper management. During 2008, the year the hedge 
fund launched a proxy contest against the Times Company, 
there were more than 300 newspaper articles that covered 
 
165 I define a campaign against a target company as one with strong 
media coverage if the campaign receives thirty or more references on the 
Factiva database during the course of the engagement. 
166 Nat Worden, Controlling Media Holders Face New Scrutiny, DOW 
JONES, Oct. 21, 2008, Factiva, Document DJ00000020081021e4al000dx. 
167 The Factiva database shows that during the three-month period 
surrounding the engagement with The Times Company, there were more 
200 media references to it. Headlines on Harbinger Campaign Against 
New York Times from Jan. 1, 2008 to Mar. 31, 2008, FACTIVA, 
https://global.factiva.com [https://perma.cc/YPA3-KBK4] (after logging in, 
click “Search”; then turn on “Query Genius” and search “Harbinger and 
fds=NYT and date from 20080101 to 20080331”). 
168 See, e.g., Marr, supra note 9 (reporting this campaign). 
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it,169 and the activist hedge fund kept announcing in the 
media that “the Times’ future depended on ‘fresh, 
independent leadership in the boardroom.’”170 
Another interesting example, the high-profile campaign 
against Dillard’s had more than 200 media references, most 
of which portrayed the controlling family in a negative light. 
In a public letter filed with the SEC in October 2008, the 
hedge funds accused management of negligence and 
nepotism and called several executives who were members of 
the controlling family “overpaid and under-qualified for the 
positions they hold.”171 One of the activist holders publicly 
argued that the performance of the company over the prior 
ten years “has been nothing short of atrocious.”172 
Eventually, a settlement was reached between Dillard’s and 
the activist groups that received board representation, with 
the controlling family taking sizable cuts in compensation.173 
Activists also conducted an aggressive public campaign 
against Comcast. In the course of the campaign, the activist 
fund called for the ousting of the company controller Brian 
Roberts, describing his management in a Wall Street Journal 
article as a “Comcastrophe” for shareholders and claiming 
that it led to a decade of “zero return.”174 The activist 
 
169 Headlines on Harbinger Campaign Against New York Times in 
2008, FACTIVA, https://global.factiva.com [https://perma.cc/YPA3-KBK4] 
(after logging in, click “Search”; then turn on “Query Genius” and search 
“Harbinger and fds=NYT and date from 20080101 to 20081231”). 
170 Joshua Chaffin, Harbinger of Conflict at NY Times, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea8375e4-e721-11dc-b5c3-000077 
9fd2ac.html#axzz43sVYRhxC [https://perma.cc/NZF4-6J93]. 
171 Rachel Dodes, Dillard’s Directors Weigh in on Attempt to Oust 
CEO, DOW JONES (Nov. 5, 2008). The hedge funds also noted that the four 
Dillard siblings have earned more than $16 million annually in the three 
years prior to the activist intervention despite a steady decline in the 
company’s performance and stock price. See James Covert, Dillard’s 
Heated at Hedgies, N.Y. POST (Oct. 31, 2008), http://nypost.com/2008/ 
10/31/dillards-heated-at-hedgies/ [https://perma.cc/7TBG-VP8X]. 
172 Dodes, supra note 171. 
173 See supra notes 105–06. 
174 Dionne Searcey, Call to Oust Comcast’s Roberts by Investor Draws 
Mixed Reviews, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at B3. 
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publicly criticized Comcast for lavishing founder Ralph 
Roberts’ estate with a multimillion-dollar benefit payable 
upon his death.175 The company’s controller succumbed to 
the intense public shaming and the pressures exercised by 
the activist fund through leading media outlets. Several 
weeks later, the company decided to eliminate its founder’s 
benefits and set his annual salary at one dollar for the rest of 
his tenure at the company.176 Additionally, it announced a 
quarterly dividend—its first dividend since 1999—and 
agreed to utilize its remaining $6.9 billion share to 
repurchase authorization within a two-year period.177 
As the above-mentioned examples suggest, hostile 
engagements that attract strong media attention and could 
harm controllers’ reputation can push those controllers to be 
more attentive to activists’ demands. However, an 
examination of all high-profile engagements shows that they 
often reach the confrontational level of a proxy contest for 
board representation. Boardroom battles are interesting and 
they could easily make it to the front page of major financial 
newspapers on a constant basis. And in order to engage in a 
proxy contest against a controlling shareholder, or at least to 
threaten to launch such a contest, an activist has to rely on a 
formal channel of activism, such as the ability to nominate a 
minority director. 
Overall, my examination shows that the variable of 
“strong media coverage”178 is strongly correlated with the 
existence of a proxy fight for board representation. Eleven 
out of the sixteen controlled companies subject to high-profile 
activist campaigns were also targets of actual proxy fights, 
 
175 Vishesh Kumar & Dionne Searcey, Comcast Drops Payout Plan for 
Founder Amid Criticism, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008, at A14. 
176 Id. 
177 Todd Shields, Comcast, Pressured by Holders, Sets Buyback, 
Dividend, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJr3e5rNrA.I&refer=us [http://perma.cc/DE 
V5-A4PY]. 
178 See supra note 165. For the purposes of this Article, Part II 
eliminated from the sample the activist engagements that relate to specific 
events, such as M&A transactions and lawsuits. 
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and one additional company was subject to a high-profile 
withhold campaign. Without an active boardroom fight, or at 
least a threat to launch one, activists are less likely to 
attract media attention.179 Only 6% of the engagements 
without any formal mechanisms received strong media 
coverage. 
In sum, while the previous Subpart showed that 
reputational forces cannot serve as an adequate substitute 
mechanism for the formal channels, this Subpart adds 
another layer to the analysis, suggesting that reputational 
forces often derive their power from the existence of formal 
channels that facilitate a proxy fight.180 These two findings 
have important policy implications. They suggest that, in 
order to enhance activism, regulators and institutional 
investors should not rely solely on reputational forces to 
provide external monitoring. 
VI. DISRUPTIVE ACTIVISM? 
So far this Article shows that activist shareholders are 
engaging with a non-negligible number of controlled firms. 
But the economic justifications for activist interventions in 
controlled companies are not trivial and require clarification. 
When a company has a controlling shareholder, the basic 
presumption is that such controller has both the skills and 
incentives to properly conduct the business of the company 
and closely monitor its professional managers.181 Two main 
arguments stem from this basic presumption: (i) controller’s 
 
179 When I tried to systemically estimate the impact of strong media 
coverage on the probability of an activist engagement to succeed by 
running a logit regression, the results (not reported) become insignificant 
once I control for the existence of a proxy fight and target firm size. 
180 See also Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2015) (showing that the formal process of 
litigation or regulatory investigations produces information, which affects 
parties’ behavior indirectly, through shaping reputational sanctions). 
181 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Doctrines and 
Markets: Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785, 792 (2003); 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 
J. FIN. 737, 754–55 (1997). 
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strategic decisions are, on average, superior to those of other 
public shareholders (including the activists); and (ii) even 
when an activist brings a value-enhancing proposal, a 
controller has no reason to oppose it in the first place, since 
this controller will be the main beneficiary of any further 
increase in the share price (due to her equity position). 
Additionally, based on the first argument, one could also 
claim that the lower percentage of activist campaigns in 
controlled companies is a result of the better management of 
controlled companies, which makes them less attractive 
targets for activism than widely held companies. 
However, this underlying presumption, and the 
arguments that stem from it, do not always hold true. 
Controlled companies vary in their ownership structure and 
many other aspects, which, in turn, impact controllers’ 
incentives and ability to perform well.182 To begin, not all 
controlling shareholders hold a large stake of the controlled 
firm’s cash flow. A significant number of controlled U.S. 
companies maintain a dual-class share structure,183 which 
allows them to control a company while holding only a small 
fraction of its cash flow rights.184 A large body of empirical 
evidence demonstrates that the use of a dual-class share 
reduces firm value while allowing poorly performing 
controllers to remain entrenched and isolated from market 
disciplinary forces.185 Such use of this control-enhancing 
 
182 See, e.g., Henrik Cronqvist & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Policies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3941 (2009) 
(discussing the significant heterogeneity across blockholders). 
183 For studies discussing the prevalence of control enhancing 
mechanism in the United States and the costs they create, see infra note 
185. 
184 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George 
Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow 
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 298–301 (Randall 
K. Morck ed., 2000) (explaining the mechanism behind dual-class stock). 
185 See, e.g., Gompers et al., supra note 27; Ronald W. Masulis, Cong 
Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 
1697, 1722 (2009); Scott B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. 
Zutter, What’s in a Vote? The Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class 
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device also increases controllers’ tendency to extract private 
benefits or to pursue high-risk activities at the expense of 
other shareholders.186 
Second, not all controllers have superior business skills. A 
significant number of controlled U.S. companies are family 
firms managed by heirs of founders,187 and economic 
literature has firmly established that firms run by decedents 
of founders underperform firms managed by hired CEOs, as 
heirs of the original founders often lack the business 
expertise, talent, or motivation of the founders.188 
Third, even if controlling shareholders maintain a large 
economic interest and possess superior skills, they may still 
have interests of their own that do not align with the 
interests of other investors, such as entrenchment, capital 
preservation, or entry into new businesses about which the 
 
Equity on IPO Firm Values, 45 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 94 (2008). See also 
INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER INSTITUTE, CONTROLLED 
COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN-YEAR PERFORMANCE 
AND RISK REVIEW (Oct. 2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Cont 
rolled-Company-ISS-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9P7-4JC6] (finding that 
controlled companies with multi-class stock structures underperform 
widely held companies and controlled companies with single-class 
structures over three-, five-, and ten-year time periods); Renée Adams & 
Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. 
FIN. 51 (2008) (conducting an extensive survey of the economic literature 
on dual-class firms and concluding that the deviations from one share, one 
vote affect the value of outside equity negatively). 
186 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 184 (presenting a model that 
proves this argument). For empirical support see, e.g., Gompers et al., 
supra note 185; Masulis et al., supra note 185. 
187 See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 47, at 207 (showing that, in 
2000, of the largest industrial U.S. firms, “founder-controlled firms 
constitute 22.3% and heir-controlled firms . . . [comprise] 25.3%, with 
average equity stakes of approximately 18% and 22%, respectively”). 
188 See, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family 
Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 
1301, 1316–17, 1321 (2003); Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 
Francisco Perez-Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, Inside the Family Firm: 
The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance, 122 Q.J. 
ECON. 647, 669–70, 684 (2007); Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do 
Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. 
FIN. ECON. 385, 399–400 (2006). 
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controllers know little but which are personally alluring.189 
Controllers can also engage in various forms of self-dealing 
transactions, commonly referred to in the literature as 
“tunneling,” which divert value from the minority 
shareholders to the controllers.190 
Finally, there are also non-pecuniary considerations, such 
as pride, envy, or animosity, which could filter into 
controllers’ decision to reject activists’ demands.191 Therefore, 
there is no reason to believe a priori that controllers’ 
decisions to oppose activists’ demands always benefit 
minority shareholders. 
To further explore this issue, I examined the different 
demands raised by activists in the course of their 
engagements with the sampled controlled companies and 
divided them into three main groups: demands related to the 
tension between controllers and minority shareholders, 
 
189 See Anderson & Reeb, supra note 188, at 1302–03 (“[F]ounding 
families have concerns and interests of their own, such as stability and 
capital preservation that may not align with the interests of other 
investors or the firm.”); Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and 
Economics of Private Benefits of Control 9 (European Corp. Governance 
Inst. Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 131/2009, 2009),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448164 [http://perma.cc/W69Y-RCWH] (noting 
that protecting controller’s psychic private benefits can harm other 
shareholders by preventing efficient changes in control in the future); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1667 
(2006) (mentioning the transformation of certain businesses associated 
with the Bronfman family from liquor and oil to entertainment as an 
example of a business decision that could be motivated by controllers’ 
desire to increase their consumption of non-pecuniary private benefits 
rather than firm value). 
190 See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000). For discussion 
and anecdotal examples of tunneling in the United States, see Vladimir 
Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2011). 
191 See Ehud Kamar, The Story of Paramount Communications v. 
QVC Network: Everything Is Personal, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 293, 
321 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). 
KASTIEL – FINAL 
120 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
board representation demands, and value/strategic demands. 
The results are summarized in Table 6. 
(i) Demands related to the tension between controllers and 
minority shareholders: The first category includes demands 
to enhance governance standards, to add independent 
directors, and to improve compensation practices. This 
category also encompasses demands to increase share price 
in going-private transactions or activists’ demands to block a 
merger at a depressed offering price. Since those demands 
relate to the basic agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders,192 it is likely that 
controllers’ decisions to oppose such demands do not align 
with the interests of all other minority shareholders (and not 
just the activists). Indeed, as shown in Part V.B, in the 
majority of the M&A-related engagements (58%), activist 
pressure pushes controllers to sweeten the offering price or 
to modify the transaction terms in a way that benefits all 
minority shareholders.193 
(ii) Demands related to board representation: The demand 
for a seat on the board may also be beneficial to other 
minority shareholders, as it could enhance the external 
monitoring of the controller or managers nominated by the 
controller. As noted earlier, an outside director who is truly 
independent of the controller is in a better position to spot 
conflict of interest transactions, bring additional information 
and perspective to the boardroom, and promote greater 
transparency and deliberation.194 Also, if shareholders 
unaffiliated with the controller oppose the nomination of the 
activist’s representative to the board, they can simply vote 
against it and reduce her chances of being elected. Evidence 
 
192 See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 181, at 740–44 (1997); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global 
Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1281 (2008). 
193 Note that in an additional 34% of the M&A-related engagements the 
activists managed to block a transaction at what they perceived as an 
undervalued price. While blocking transactions may benefit minority 
shareholders (if the offering price is truly depressed), it is not necessarily 
always the case, because the activists could also block efficient transactions. 
194 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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shows, however, that when an activist event becomes a proxy 
fight, and public shareholders have to choose between 
controllers’ nominees and activists’ nominees, they tend to 
support the board nominees of the activists.195 
(iii) Value-enhancing/strategic demands: The last 
category includes value-enhancing/strategic demands, such 
as demands to divest the company’s assets, to return cash to 
shareholders, to review strategic alternatives, and so on. It is 
difficult to know a priori whether this type of proposal 
benefits minority shareholders as a whole, and not just the 
activists. However, the average total shareholder return 
during the three-year period that preceded the activist 
intervention of all the companies that were subject to any 
strategic demands (-9.8%) shows that they generally tend to 
underperform. 
In addition, a review of the ownership structure, control 
mechanism, and other characteristics of the twenty-four 
controlled companies that were subject to core strategic 
demands196 further suggest that those companies, at least on 
their face, meet the profile of companies that tend to 
underperform. For instance, 75% of these companies have a 
dual-class structure with an extreme divergence between 
controllers’ ownership rights and voting rights. Additionally, 
all of these companies are mature, where the controllers 
(usually family members) have been entrenched for an 
extended period. In fact, the “youngest” company on this list 
was established in 1989, and the average “age” of the 
 
195 The dissident nominees were elected in the vast majority of the 
proxy fights in my sample, including in the following cases: Media 
General, Inc. (2007); Morgans Hotel (2013); National Interstate 
Corporation (2013); Private Media Group (2011); Telephone and Data 
Systems, Inc. (1997); The Quigley Corporation (2009); and Whitney 
Information Network, Inc. (2009). Even when the activist failed to 
nominate its representatives to the board, it is often the case that such 
representatives received the majority support of shareholders unaffiliated 
with the controller. See Barnes and Noble (2009) and the withhold 
campaign against Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. (2008). 
196 Core strategic demands are demands to divest the company’s 
assets, to return cash to shareholders, or to initiate a capital 
restructuring. 
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companies studied here is more than sixty years old. In more 
than half of them, the heirs of the founders either took over 
or were involved in the management of the controlled firms. 
As noted earlier, there is a large body of economic literature 
documenting mediocre performance of mature dual-class 
firms or family firms controlled by heirs of the founders,197 
and activists’ decisions to focus on this segment of controlled 
companies (rather than companies controlled by private 
equity firms, venture capital firms, or “younger” dual-class 
firms) suggest that the value/strategic demands they raise 
could benefit other minority investors. This data is also 
consistent with general evidence that hedge fund activists 
tend to target underperforming companies.198 
  
 
197 See supra note 188. 
198 See supra notes 38–39. 
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Table 6: Activists’ Demands 
Activists’ Demands199 Yes No Total 
1. Demands related to the tension between 
controllers/minority holders   
  i. Governance Demands: 
Add Independent Directors 
Compensation Related Enhancements 
Other Governance Enhancements 
Remove Directors or Officers 
Remove Takeover Defenses 
  ii. M&A Related Demands: 
   Block Merger/Agitate for Higher Price 
   Potential Acquisition (Friendly  



































2. Representation Demands: 







3. Value/Strategic Demands: 
Breakup Company, Divest Assets/Divisions 
Other Capital Structure Related, Increase  
       Leverage, etc. 
Return Cash via Dividends/Buybacks 
Review Strategic Alternatives 
Seek Sale/Merger/Liquidation 






















  3 
Total: 97 181 278 
 
Finally, I have also explored the hypothesis that activist 
investors may be willing to engage with controlled companies 
simply to extract quick private benefits from the controllers 
by forcing them to buy back the activists’ stake. Certain 
activist campaigns—even those that are unlikely to 
succeed—may intentionally disrupt the activity of a 
controlled company and publicly challenge the way a 
controller manages the company by engaging in what could 
 
199 “Yes”/“No” indicate whether an activist’s demand was 
accepted/rejected, respectively.  
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be viewed as “disruptive activism.” Since the controlled 
company has to bear the legal, reputational, and other costs 
associated with conducting a proxy fight or defending the 
controller’s position, the controlled company may simply opt 
to save those costs and terminate any disruptive activity by 
buying out the activist shareholder at a premium. In fact, 
this type of buy-out is somewhat similar to the much-
maligned 1980s tactic of “greenmail.”200 While a buy-out of 
an activist stake may not always benefit other non-activist 
shareholders, and sometimes even comes at their expense, it 
can also provide activists with additional ex ante incentives 
to launch a campaign against controlled companies.201 
The empirical evidence provides little support for the 
disruptive activism story. A search on the SharkWatch 
database yields only a handful of examples of activist 
interventions with controlled companies that resulted in the 
repurchase of the activist stake by the target company.202 
 
200 “Greenmail” has generally been defined as the practice of 
purchasing enough shares in a company to threaten a takeover, and then 
using that leverage to pressure the target company to buy those shares 
back at a premium in order to abandon the takeover. See, e.g., Jonathan R. 
Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate 
Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 13–15 (1985). 
201 It is important to emphasize, however, that activists are unlikely 
to generate high abnormal returns through disruptive activism if ex ante a 
campaign has no likelihood of success. If the main channels of activism 
discussed in Parts IV and V are not effective enough to facilitate 
engagements with controlled companies, controllers may simply ignore the 
activists’ demands without providing them any side payments. 
202 One example is the engagement with Tix Corporation, a controlled 
company whose management held approximately 37% of the firm voting 
rights. In June 2011, after an activist player announced its intention to 
nominate a slate of directors at the upcoming annual meeting, the 
company accused the activist of trying to “extract greenmail” from it by 
forcing the company to buy the activist’s stake. In July 2011, the parties 
reached a settlement pursuant to which the company agreed to add three 
activist nominees to the Board, and in December 2013, the company 
agreed to repurchase the activist stake.  See Press Release, Tix 
Corporation (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ 
tix-corporation-announces-stock-repurchase-and-director-resignations-
otcqx-tixc-1865252.htm [http://perma.cc/DF8L-DDHH]; Press Release, Tix 
Corporation, Tix Corporation Announces Stock Repurchase and Director 
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Disruptive activism seems to have very little power, if any, to 
explain activism in controlled companies.203 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings presented in this Article raise a few 
important implications for policy makers and institutional 
investors. To start, it shows that controlled companies are 
more insulated from activism than widely held companies 
(although they are not fully immune to it),204 and this 
relative insulation could affect entrepreneurs’ decision-
making at the IPO stage. For instance, it could increase the 
incentives for entrepreneurs to retain control when they take 
their firm public in order to better shield themselves from 
the market for corporate influence.205 Indeed, recent evidence 
shows that there is a general upward trend in the adoption 
of dual-class stock as a control enhancing mechanism.206 
Once a company goes public with a dual-class structure, its 
controller has a tendency to retain this structure and remain 
entrenched for a long period of time,207 even if she is no 
longer best situated to manage the company.208 
 
Resignations (June 30, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ 
tix-corporation-sends-letter-to-stockholders-124783023.html [http://perma. 
cc/BCM6-RY28]. 
203 For an empirical study supporting this view, see Belcredi & 
Enriques, supra note 64, at 31–32 (researching shareholder activism in 
Italy and finding no sufficient evidence to support the “dark side” view of 
activism). 
204 See supra Part III.A. 
205 For a discussion about the increasing use of dual-class stock, see 
infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
206 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with their Dollars 
to Have Less of a Say, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/shareholders-vote-
with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8RDT-
6JLH] (“More than 13.5 percent of the 133 companies listing shares on 
United States exchanges in 2015 have set up a dual-class structure, 
according to the data provider Dealogic. That compares with 12 percent 
last year and just 1 percent in 2005.”). 
207 For instance, data collected from SharkRepellent shows that 
controllers systematically reject shareholder proposals to dismantle dual-
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Furthermore, when activists do engage with controlled 
companies, a large number of these engagements are 
facilitated by certain legal arrangements—such as the ability 
to elect minority directors or to veto conflicted transactions—
which augment activists’ leverage vis-à-vis the controllers. 
These formal bargaining mechanisms substantially increase 
the likelihood that activists’ voices will be heard. In their 
absence, controllers are likely to be insulated from hedge 
fund activism, and even when an activist engagement occurs, 
controllers tend to ignore activists’ concerns.209 However, 
issuers have few incentives to voluntarily adopt legal 
arrangements that empower activists, such as the right to 
elect minority directors. While a subset of dual-class firms 
went public with a capital structure allowing shareholders 
not affiliated with the controller to elect minority directors, 
this arrangement was most common in mature dual-class 
firms that were required to do so in order to comply with a 
previous policy of the AMEX.210 Current listing requirements 
of the major U.S. stock exchanges no longer impose any 
restrictions on new issuances of unequal voting stock,211 and 
 
class capital structure. Between 2005 and 2014, investors voted on fifty 
shareholder proposals to eliminate dual-class structures at twenty-two 
Russell 3000 companies, with none receiving majority support, mainly 
because the controlling shareholders voted against them (after logging in 
to SharkRepellent, click the “Proxy Tab” and search based on “Proposal: 
Eliminate Dual-Class Stock”, “Index: Russell 1000, Russell 2000”, and 
“Proxy Proposal brought by shareholders”). 
208 For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see Lucian Bebchuk 
& Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-class Stock (Nov. 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
209 Within the group of controlled companies that were subject to 
activism, only 21% of the activist events were enacted when the activists 
lacked any formal bargaining tools, and the success rate of these 
engagements was low (11%). 
210 See supra notes 108–14. 
211 See, e.g., NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 313.00 (2015), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&s
electednode=chp_1_4_13&CiRestriction=313&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsection
s%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/DQK5-VYDN]; NASDAQ Stock 
Market, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market Rules § 5640 (2015), http://nasdaq. 
cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1
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controlled companies that went public in the past decade 
(when hedge fund activism gained steam) were unlikely to 
voluntarily adopt such an arrangement212 and subject 
themselves to the disciplinary power of activist holders. 
Finally, an analysis of “against all odds” engagements 
and engagements that receive strong public attention shows 
that controllers’ reputational concerns also play a role in 
encouraging activism and disciplining controllers, but mostly 
when such forces serve as a complementary mechanism, 
operating in conjunction with other formal bargaining 
mechanisms. When activists have no other apparent formal 
bargaining mechanisms, reputational markets alone have a 
mild disciplinary effect, at best, on controlling shareholders, 
and they are far from a perfect substitute for formal 
bargaining mechanisms.213 
Understanding the mechanisms that facilitate activism in 
controlled companies and their limits is important, since a 
significant number of controlled companies maintain a dual-
class share structure or are heir-controlled firms, and 
empirical evidence shows that these types of firms tend to 
underperform widely held companies.214 Therefore, 
regulators and institutional investors, who view activism as 
a value-enhancing development,215 which could curb 




212 For instance, of all the dual-class firms in the Sample of Publicly-
disclosed Engagements that provide public shareholders with the ability to 
elect minority directors (eighteen companies in total), only one company 
was established after 2005. Similarly, I found that only four out of all the 
Delaware dual-class firms that had proportional voting for directors as of 
2012 (twenty-six companies) went public after 2005. 
213 See supra Part V.B. 
214 See supra notes 185–88. 
215 As explained earlier, recent empirical studies, as well as the data 
presented in this Article, support the value-enhancing view of activist 
engagements. See supra notes 38–39 (discussing the positive short- and 
long-term effects of hedge fund activism) and the discussion in Part VI 
(analyzing the different demands raised by activist investors and showing 
how they could benefit other minority shareholders). 
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shareholders might benefit, should not rely on reputation 
markets as the sole facilitators of activist engagements. Nor 
should they rely on issuers to adopt arrangements that 
facilitate activism, as issuers have no incentive to voluntarily 
subject themselves to the disciplinary power of activist 
holders. Instead, they are urged to adopt arrangements that 
will further encourage activism in controlled companies, and 
the most efficient way to accomplish this goal would be to 
grant shareholders unaffiliated with the controllers the right 
to elect a minority slate of directors, or to block the 
nomination of certain directors nominated by the controlling 
shareholders. 
As Part V.A shows, this mechanism increases activists’ 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the controller (even if the 
majority of the board is filled with directors related to the 
controller), and may cause controlling shareholders to 
become more attentive to shareholders’ concerns. Such a 
mechanism provides public shareholders in controlled firms 
with powers that are somewhat similar to those that 
shareholders of widely held firms have. It gives hedge funds 
the ability to threaten a proxy fight and to nominate a 
number of directors to the board, and it gives institutional 
holders the ability to vote against the election of the 
controller’s director nominees if the controller ignores well-
supported shareholder proposals. 
A few jurisdictions have already implemented somewhat 
similar solutions. Italy’s voto di lista rule adopted in 2007 
requires, under certain conditions, both the board of 
directors and the board of auditors to have at least one 
member elected by minority shareholders.216 Evidence shows 
that hedge funds invest in Italian companies with 
 
216 Under Italian law, the shareholding required for submission of a 
minority slate for the election of the board of directors varies from 0.5% to 
4.5% according to the size of the company’s market capitalization. For 
additional discussion regarding this rule, see Matteo Erede, Andrea di 
Segni & John Wilcox, Italy’s ‘Vote by Slate’ – an Innovative Method to Elect 
Minority Directors, INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK 54–55 (2009), 
http://www.sodali.com/static/allegati/C-0016.pdf [http://perma.cc/W4UM-
HEX6]. 
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concentrated ownership when they are able to take 
advantage of this legal tool that allows minority 
shareholders to elect their representative to the board of 
directors.217 In Sweden, a firm’s three to five largest 
shareholders can form a nominations committee for board 
members, and any shareholder can nominate board 
candidates prior to the annual meeting.218 When the 
company has a dominant shareholder, at least one member 
of the committee must be independent of the company’s 
largest shareholder.219 Marco Becht el al. show that when 
activists join the nominations committee, they succeed in 
appointing directors sympathetic to their goals who are able 
to influence the engagement outcomes.220 
In fact, the proposed solution is not new even in the 
United States. The Wang formula—a statement of policy 
implemented by the AMEX from 1976 through the middle of 
the 1980s (the time when major U.S. exchanges relaxed their 
restrictions on the use of dual-class stock)—required dual-
class firms that went public during that period to entitle 
public holders with the right to elect 25% of the board of 
directors.221 Evidence presented in this Article shows that 
such special governance structure has become an important 
channel of activism.222 
Though a detailed analysis of all the costs and benefits of 
the proposal to entitle public shareholders with the right to 
nominate minority directors is beyond the scope of this 
 
217 See Erede, supra note 65, at 359; Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 
64. 
218 Becht et al., supra note 60, at 15–16. See also Rolf Skog & Erik 
Sjöman, Corporate Governance in Sweden, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MODEL 247, 260–62 (Per Lekvall ed., 2014); Rolf H. Carlsson, 
Swedish Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Owners Still in the 
Driver’s Seat, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1038, 1049–50 (2007). 
219 Skog & Sjöman, supra note 218, at 261. Also, when the dominant 
shareholder owns less than 50% of the voting power, such shareholder has 
to cooperate with other public shareholders in order to secure a majority 
vote at the annual general meeting.  
220 Becht et al., supra note 60, at 15–16. 
221 See supra notes 108–14. 
222 See supra notes 114–15. 
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Article, it certainly merits additional exploration. Recently, 
Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani called for granting 
public investors certain say in the elections and terminations 
of some independent directions in order to make those 
directors effective monitors of controlling shareholders. They 
provided a comprehensive analysis of such solution.223 This 
Article highlights another important aspect of any proposal 
to empower public shareholders to appoint minority 
directors, showing that such right plays a crucial role in 
encouraging activism in controlled companies and reducing 
the insulation of controllers from external monitoring. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 “I have seen the future and it is very much like the 
present, only longer.” 
—Kehlog Albran, The Profit 
 
If one had to predict the future of U.S. corporate 
governance, then based on this quote, the safest prediction 
would be that the two major governance developments in 
recent years—the rise in shareholder activism and the 
increased use of concentrated ownership—will continue to 
gain importance. Activists are here to stay as long as agency 
problems exist, and as long as the corporate law regime does 
not impede their ability to initiate governance and strategic 
changes in underperforming firms. Similarly, certain 
entrepreneurs are expected to continue going public while 
retaining control over their firms, often through the use of 
dual-class structures (unless such a structure is limited by 
regulators). These two major governance developments do 
not progress along parallel lines. It is the first development 
(the rise in activism) that could further enhance the second 
development (increased concentrated ownership) by 
fortifying the incentives of entrepreneurs to retain control in 
order to insulate themselves from the market for corporate 
influence. Indeed, recent evidence shows that there is a 
 
223 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Making Independent 
Directors Work, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2016). 
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general upward trend in the adoption of dual-class stock, and 
this structure is becoming “the current flavor.”224 
This Article is the first endeavor to explore the 
interaction between these two major governance 
developments—that is, how shareholder activism impacts 
controlled U.S. companies. Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
this Article documents a non-negligible number of 
shareholder engagements with controlled firms, and it shows 
that activists’ bargaining power vis-à-vis controllers is not 
always as limited as initially predicted. It also highlights a 
few motivating forces that facilitate activism against 
controlled companies, including the right to nominate and 
elect minority directors, the right to veto going-private 
transactions, and the use of litigation as a means to put 
pressure on controllers. Finally, this Article also provides 
some anecdotal evidence showing that controllers’ 
reputational concerns also play a role in encouraging 
activism and disciplining controllers when these forces 
operate in conjunction with other legal and formal 
bargaining mechanisms. 
However, regulators and institutional investors who view 
activism as an important disciplinary mechanism should not 
rely solely on the current regulatory framework or 
reputation markets to continue facilitating this activity. The 
increasing use of dual-class structures, which allows issuers 
to maintain full control over their companies for indefinite 
periods of time, along with issuers’ recent tendency not to 
adopt arrangements that provide public shareholders with 
the right to nominate and elect minority directors 
substantially weaken the most common channel of 
 
224 See Green & Levy, supra note 48. A senior practitioner who has 
been involved in more than 100 IPOs has stated: “This [dual-class 
structure] is the current flavor . . . . Five years ago, people weren’t asking 
about them. Now everyone is asking about it right away.” Id. Another 
senior partner, who helped Facebook set up its initial corporate-
governance structure, said: “People look at Facebook and see what they 
have done . . . . It’s become a much more common thing to implement dual-
class capital structures in Silicon Valley companies.” Id. See also supra 
note 206. 
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activism.225 Moreover, as shown in this Article, when 
activists have no other apparent formal bargaining 
mechanisms, controllers are more likely to ignore their 
demands, and reputational markets alone have a mild 
disciplinary effect, at best. 
For these reasons, regulators and institutional investors, 
who are interested in encouraging activism in controlled 
companies, are urged to require issuers to grant 
shareholders unaffiliated with the controllers the right to 
elect minority directors. This solution, which needs to be 
further fleshed out, may not solve all the governance 
problems in controlled companies, but it certainly has the 
potential to make controlling shareholders more accountable 
to other public shareholders by creating an effective platform 
for activist involvement. 
 
 
225 Supra note 213. 
